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INTRODUCTION

On November 25, 1976, the United States and Mexico con-

cluded a bilateral treaty providing for reciprocal prisoner ex-

change, so that a national of one party to the agreement could
complete his sentence in his home country.' The objectives of the
agreement essentially were twofold: first, there was a need to ameof the abuse of
liorate relations with Mexico on the delicate matter
2

American citizens confined in Mexican prisons; second, there was

t In this Article, the author, though recognizing that the feminine gender -is
equally appropriate, uses the masculine gender for personal pronouns. This convention is adopted for the purposes of style and consistency.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Director,
Kansas Defender Project. A.B. 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1973, Harvard

University.
The author is grateful to Ms. Nancy S. Roush, a third-year student at the University of Kansas School of Law, for her valuable assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United StatesMexico, T.I.A.S. No. 8718, reprinted in TREATY WITH MEXICO ON THE EXECUTION OF
as
PENAL SENTENCES, S. EXEC. DOC. D, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited
Treaty].
2. For an enumeration of human rights violations alleged to have taken place in
the Mexican prison system, see, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. H11,459 (daily ed. Oct. 25,
1977) (remarks of Rep. Stark); note 205 infra. In late 1977, there were more than
2,300 Americans in foreign jails; approximately 600 were confined in Mexico alone.
See, e.g., Implementation of Treatiesfor the Transfer of Offenders to or from Foreign
Countries. Hearings on HR. 7148 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenshi,
and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on tke Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. i
in
(1977) [hereinafter cited as House Judiciary Hearings]; U.S. Citizens Imprisoned
Affairs
Military
and
Political
International
on
Subcomm.
Mexico. Hearings Before the
ofthe House Comm on InternationalRelations (pt. III), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (19751976); N.Y. Times, June 14, 1976, at 11, col. 1. This concern for the manner of treat-
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a strong desire to alleviate special hardships, such as those respecting living conditions and prospects for rehabilitation, resulting
from imprisonment in a foreign country. 3 The Treaty was rati-

fied unanimously by the Senate on July 21, 1977, 4 and enabling
legislation was approved by Congress and signed into law on Oc6
tober 31, 1977. 5 The Treaty became effective one month later,
and in December 1977 the first group of prisoners was transferred
ment of United States nationals incarcerated in Mexico precipitated the negotiations
for and conclusion of the Treaty, which was initiated by Mexico because of bad publicity, see 123 CONG. REC. S12,552 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen),
and was a part of a larger effort by the United States to influence Mexican arrest and
interrogation procedures and improve prison conditions. 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 211
(1976) (statement by William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military
Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations).
3. See Letter of Transmittal, Message from the President of the United States to
the Senate (Treaty with Mexico on the Execution of Penal Sentences), 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., Exec. D, (1977), reprintedin House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 232; H.
R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1977), reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3148. On the issue of special hardships, such as being far from one's
family and friends, see, e.g., Transfer of Offenders andAdministrationof Foreign Penal
Sentences.-Hearingson S 1682 Before the Subcomm. on Penitentiaries and Corrections
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Judiciary Hearings] ("Imprisonment is never an easy life. Adjustments are more difficult under those conditions being several thousand miles from
home as compared to the circumstances where you have support from families closer
to home.") (statement of Sen. Mathias). See also id. at 1, 26, 62, 120, 123, 293; Penal
Treaties with Mexico and Canada."Hearings on Exec. D andExec. H Beore the Senate
Comm. on ForeignRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings]; House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 3, 180. On
the related rehabilitation issue, see, e.g., Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra at 62, 120,
130 ("Many of the young Americans I talked to were much embittered and felt very
frustrated and deserted. I think that their outlook was that the chances for return to
some kind of normal life would be greater if they had been able to serve out their
terms in American prisons.") (statement of Sen. Mathias), 133, 254-55 (hardships in
Mexican prisons caused "debilitation") (statement of Dwight Worker, former prisoner in Mexico), 258, 262, 293, 302 ("How can one hope to rehabilitate a person when
he cannot understand the language, the customs, or the traditions?") (statement of
Michael Griffith, attorney), 310-12; House JudiciaryHearings, supra note 2, at 126.
On "dehabilitation" in American prisons, see, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388,
403 (10th Cir. 1977).
Another concern of the negotiators of the Treaty was to enhance international
cooperation in penal matters. See, e.g., Treaty, supra note 1, at preamble; Letter of
Submittal from the Secretary of State to the President of the United States, Jan. 17,
1977, reprintedin House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 233-34; cf N.Y. Times,
July 19, 1978, at 3, col. 1 (discussing U.S.-Mexican negotiations for a treaty for cooperation in the administration of justice). See also note 208 & accompanying text
infra.
4. See 123 CONG. REC. S12,553 (daily ed. July 21, 1977).
5. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, 91 Stat. 1212 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 955, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4100-4115, 28 U.S.C. § 2256).
6. See Treaty, supra note 1, at art. X, para. 2. The Treaty remains in force for
three years, subject to automatic renewal in three-year periods should neither contracting party have notified the other of its intention to let the Treaty terminate ninety
days before the period expires. Id. at para. 3.
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7
from Mexico to the United States.
In terms of its operation, the transfer to the United States is

made subject to the following conditions regarding the status of

must be one that
both the offender and the offense: (1) the offense
8 and is not a political
is generally punishable in the United States
or immigration offense; 9 (2) the offender must be both a0 national
of the United States and not a domiciliary of Mexico;' and (3)
there must be at least six months remaining on the sentence, with

no appeal or collateral attack proceeding pending and the time for

appeal expired."I There also is a requirement of consent-by
12
Mexico, as the transferring state, by the United States, as the
7. See, e.g., TIME, Dec. 19, 1977, at 25. The Treaty is entirely reciprocal, allowing eligible Mexicans incarcerated in the United States the opportunity to transfer
to Mexico. Reference is made in this Article, however, only to eligible Americans
confined in Mexico who choose to return to the United States. For a brief discussion
of the reasons for some eligible prisoners not wishing to be transferred, see note 144
infra.
8. Although most of the Americans confined in Mexican prisons had been convicted of or were awaiting trial on charges of drug offenses, many had been involved
in non-drug-related crimes. See generally Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at
70-119, 132. Moreover, not all of the prisoners were nominal or first offenders. See,
e.g., House Judiciary Hearings,supra note 2, at 27.
9. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 4; cf. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1978, at 2, col.
3 (discussing arrests of political dissidents in Mexico). The basic reason for this provision was that
the Mexicans do not regard it to be a criminal offense for a person to
seek their [sic] economic improvement by coming to the United
States-by crossing the border and coming to the United States. It
would not be a crime in Mexico to do so. . . and, therefore, they have
taken a position that they will not keep. . . in a Mexican jail, someone
who has been convicted in the United States of an immigration offense.
House JudiciaryHearings, supra note 2, at 29 (statement of Mike Abbell, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Criminal Division). But because this is an ongoing Treaty, see note 6
supra, a change in the legal interpretation by one country could enable transfers at a
later date of prisoners who initially were ineligible. See id.
10. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. II, paras. 2, 3. "A 'domiciliary' means a person
who has been present in the territory of one of the parties for at least five years with
an intent to remain permanently therein." Id. at art. IX, para. 4.
11. Id. at art. II, paras. 5, 6. Further, no offender is to be transferred unless
either the sentence that he is serving has a specified duration, or such a duration
subsequently has been fixed by the appropriate administrative authorities. Id. at art.
IV, para. 6.
12. Id. at para. 1. There is some question whether Mexico has complete discretion to grant or deny permission to transfer. A memorandum of law submitted by
the State Department suggested that consent was discretionary. See Senate Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 3, at 207 (memorandum of Detlev F. Vagts). However, the
literal language of the Treaty states that the transferring state determines whether the
transfer is appropriate and, if so, then that state must submit a request for transfer.
Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, para. 2. In this context, "appropriate" could be read
to mean that all the mechanical conditions for transfer are met. It could also refer to
a more subjective standard according to which one must weigh the "probability that
Id. at
the transfer will contribute to the social rehabilitation of the offender ......
para. 4. The latter interpretation was employed by the Senate in its report on the
Treaty. S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977). This, then, arguably
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receiving state,' 3 and by the prisoner.' 4 Although ordinarily
Mexico would initiate the transfer procedures, a prisoner could
submit a request for transfer to the authorities.' 5
Once a prisoner has been transferred, adjudicative and custodial powers over him are divided between the two countries.
Mexico retains the power to alter the original conviction and
length of sentence and to pardon or grant amnesty to the offender,' 6 and it has exclusive jurisdiction over any form of collateral attack on the original sentence; 17 the United States supervises
the completion of the prison term, applies its laws on parole and
conditional release,' 8 and takes jurisdiction over challenges to
conditions of confinement and the constitutionality of the
Treaty.' 9 The agreement, which protects the transferred offender
gives Mexico some discretion to refuse to transfer a prisoner and could be utilized by
Mexican officials to keep in that country a prisoner who otherwise would be eligible
for transfer.
13. Treaty, supra note 1,at art. IV, para. 3. The decision by the receiving state is
subject to the requirement that it
bear in mind all factors bearing upon the probability that the transfer
will contribute to the social rehabilitation of the offender, including the
nature and severity of his offense and his previous criminal record, if
any, his medical condition, the strength of his connections by residence,
presence in the territory, family relations and otherwise to the social life
of the Transferring State and the Receiving State.
Id. at para. 4. It is not clear whether this means that the only basis for denying
consent can be the unlikelihood of enhanced opportunities for rehabilitation. An
analysis of the Treaty in the Senate report states that this paragraph establishes the
criteria for determining the suitability of the transfer. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977). There was an indication in the congressional hearings,
however, that paragraph 4 could be used by the United States to prevent the return of
a major drug dealer or some other unsavory criminal that the United States would

prefer to keep incarcerated for a longer time. See, e.g., House Judiciary Hearings,

supra note 2, at 161-65 (testimony of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State).
Such an occurrence might raise equal protection and other legal problems.

14. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, para. 2. This consent must be express rather
than implied. Id.
15. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, para. 1.
16. Id. at art. V,para. 2. The receiving state is bound to honor these determinations. Id.
17. Id. at art. VI. See also id. at art. V, para. 2.
18. Id. at art. V,para. 2. Theoretically, the signatories' national penal authorities could grant parole to transferred prisoners deemed to have been unjustly tried
and convicted without adequate procedural safeguards by the transferor forum. In
practice, however, such action undoubtedly would be constrained by diplomatic considerations. See note 168 infra.
19. See Treaty, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 2; 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(b)(3) (West
Supp. 1978). Such a challenge would be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3),
2255 (1976). See note 24 infra. One congressional witness suggested that the transferred prisoners be confined in state, rather than federal, prisons. Under such a system, the federal government would serve only as a "clearinghouse of information and
coordinator and expeditor of transfers of offenders." Senate Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 3, at 316 (statement of Milton G. Rector, President, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency).
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from being subjected to double jeopardy in the United States for
the crime for which he was convicted in Mexico, 20 governs, in addition to adult offenders, those confined as mentally ill or youthful offenders, 2 1 and it guarantees all transferred prisoners
treatment that22conforms to the procedural safeguards of their

home country.

Although the Treaty met with little opposition in the Sen-

ate, 23 substantial concern was expressed on several points-most
prominently that the Treaty might violate the Constitution because it precluded a transferred prisoner from collaterally attacking the Mexican conviction in the United States courts. 24 One
20. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VII.
21. Id. at art. VIII.
22. See id. at art. V, para. 2. Other provisions of the Treaty require that a prisoner's civil rights in the receiving state not be prejudiced more than they would have
been in the transferor forum. Id. at para. 6.
A bilateral prisoner exchange treaty also has been entered into with Canada.
Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada,
reprintedin TREATY WITH CANADA ON THE EXECUTION OF PENAL SENTENCES, S.
ExEC. Doc. H, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Treaty with Canada].
The Senate ratified the Treaty with Canada on July 19, 1977, 123 CONG. REC.
S 12,268 (daily ed. July 19, 1977), and implementing legislation was signed into law on
October 31, 1977. See note 5 supra. Unlike the Treaty with Mexico, this Treaty
"did not come about as a result of drug enforcement efforts, adverse prison conditions
or publicity. The Canadian authorities originated the idea in order to promote rehabilitation of parolees." S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977). See
also Treaty with Canada, supra at art. III, para. 6; Senate Foreign RelationsHearings,
supra note 3, at 18, 55-56. Therefore, this Article does not address the Treaty with
Canada, for the circumstances in which the eligible prisoners must make their decisions to transfer vel non are wholly dissimilar.
In any event, the two treaties with the United States are virtually identical, with
two significant exceptions. First, transfers under the Canadian agreement must be
requested by an application of the offender to the authority designated by the appropriate party to supervise the functions of the Treaty. Treaty with Canada, supra at
art. III, para. 1; see Treaty, supra note 1, at art. III. See also Treaty with Canada,
supra at art. III, para. 3. Second, each signatory must inform all potential applicants
of the Treaty's provisions regarding exchange. Treaty with Canada, supra at art. III,
para. 2. Under the Mexican Treaty, however, transfers are initiated by the penal
authority of the transferring state and require the consent of the offender to effect the
transfer. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, paras. 1, 2. Thus, while the consent of the
incarcerated offender and the approval of both signatory nations to the exchange are
required by both agreements, the procedures for initiation of the transfer differ markedly. See also S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
The other major distinction between the two treaties is that the Treaty with Canada makes specific provision for the transfer of parolees and those persons receiving
suspended sentences. See Treaty with Canada, supraat preamble; S. EXEC. REP. No.
10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
23. See generally S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.passim (1977); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3,passim; Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra
note 3, passim.
24. For concern that this provision was a major constitutional obstacle, see, e.g.,
Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 2, 62, 124, 130, 177; House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 2, at 2, 177, 179, 227. Although precluded from directly attacking the
Mexican conviction, a prisoner still could bring a habeas corpus action in the United
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reason that this problem arises is that the reciprocal prisoner exchange concept is novel to domestic law. 25 The closest analogue
is the law of international extradition, but that situation is significantly distinguishable.26 Further, although there is a significant
body of analogous precedent available, it is incomplete, uncertain,
and often inconsistent. This Article addresses the constitutional
muddle through which the courts must wade in adjudicating chalStates challenging the transfer procedures, the manner of execution of the Treaty,
conditions of confinement, or the constitutionality of the Treaty or the enabling legislation. A transferred prisoner also is not precluded from seeking relief from violations by United States officials who were unlawfully involved in the foreign
conviction proceedings. See H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1977),
. reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3164-66. See also note 19 &
accompanying text supra; notes 28-44 & accompanying text infra.
25. But see note 272 infra. Prior to the agreement with Mexico, the United
States had never entered into a bilateral pact that sanctioned the reciprocal exchange
of prisoners in order to allow them to serve the remainder of their sentences in the
home country. The closest direct analogy is Article XXII(7)(b) of the Facilities and
Areas and the Status of Forces in Korea Agreement (SOFA), June 9, 1966, United
States-Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677, 1697-98, T.I.A.S. No. 6127, which provides that South
Korea is to give "sympathetic consideration" to any United States request to take
custody of United States citizens sentenced by Korean courts under the terms of the
Agreement. However, this provision has never been implemented. But such reciprocal prisoner agreements are not without international precedent. The multilateral
European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, May 28,
1970, Europ. T.S. No. 70, reprntedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 445 (1970), resembles the
recent Mexican and Canadian treaties with the United States, although its more comprehensive provisions encompass the treatment of offenders who remain at large, id.
at pt. II, § 1, art. 2(a), and extends the concept of reciprocity to the payment of fines in
addition to the completion of prison terms. Id. at art. 2(b). Similarly, the Scandinavian nations have provided for the exchange of prisoners, within the framework of a
multilateral agreement, since 1948. See Convention Regarding the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Criminal Matters, Mar. 8, 1948, Denmark-NorwaySweden, 27 U.N.T.S. 117. See also Scandinavian Act of Enforcement of May 22,
1963, cited in Oehler, Recognition of Foreign PenalJudgments and their Enforcement,
in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 263 n.3 (M. Bassiouni & V.
Nanda eds. 1973); Swiss Federal Act of Jan. 22, 1892, quoted in 2 A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261-62 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973). See
generally De Schutter, InternationalCriminalCooperation-TheBenelux Example, in
2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 249, 254-58 (M. Bassiouni & V.
Nanda eds. 1973); Hulsman, The Role of Sentences Passedin the Absence of the Accused in Arrangementsforthe Enforcement of Foreign CriminalSentences, in ASPECTS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL VALIDITY OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS 29 (European Comm.
on Crime Problems, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1968); Shearer, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Judgments, 47 AUSTL. L.J. 585 (1973).
Of course, reciprocal prisoner exchange on an individual basis is not a novel
idea, see, e.g., TIME, July 10, 1978, at 25, col. 1; TIME, May 15, 1978, at 46, col. 1,but
that is not the subject of this Article. In fact, such exchanges normally involve political criminals, who are expressly ineligible under the Treaty with Mexico. Treaty,
supra note 1, at art. II, para. 4. (There is no similar provision in the Treaty with
Canada.) See generally A. DOLGUN & P. WATSON, ALEXANDER DOLGUN'S STORY:
AN AMERICAN IN THE GULAG (1975); N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1978, at B28, col. 1.
26. See notes 39-44 & accompanying text infra.
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lenges to the prohibition against collateral attack, 27 which in the
United States ordinarily is effectuated by a writ of habeas corpus.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE:

No

ACCESS TO HABEAS CORPUS

ConstitutionalRight to Challenge the Mexican Conviction
In analyzing the relationship of habeas corpus to the Treaty,
the initial issue to consider is whether the transferred prisoner has
any right at all to institute a collateral challenge. On this point, it
is at least clear that no American rights could be claimed successA.

fully before the transfer of a United States citizen convicted of a

crime and imprisoned in Mexico. 28 In an early United States
Supreme Court case in which an American prisoner had contested
extradition to a foreign country on due process grounds, the Court
plainly stated that a citizen of the United States who commits a
crime in a foreign country was subject to that country's laws and
could make no claim to the protection of the Constitution or laws
of the United States: "[T]hose provisions [of the Constitution concerning fundamental guarantees, such as the writ of habeas
corpus] have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdic' 29
tion of the United States against the laws of a foreign country.

Recent judicial opinions have supported this conclusion. In
United States v. Toscanino,30 for example, in which the defend-

ant's major contention on appeal was that his presence within the
jurisdiction of the United States had been obtained illegally as the
result of his seizure by Uruguayan authorities, 3 1 the United States
27. See note 47 infra. For a list of other potential constitutional deficiencies in
the Treaty, see note 276 infra. See also note 162 infra.
28. On the nature and extent of Mexican due process and sentences, see, e.g.,
Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 64, 126, 288, 304. See generally CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 20, §§ I-X. (For a translation, see 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Mexico art. 20, §§

I-X (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1973).)
29. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901). See also Holmes v. Laird, 459
F.2d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972). "What we learn from
Neely is that a surrender of an American citizen required by treaty for purposes of a
foreign criminal proceeding is unimpaired by an absence in the foreign judicial sys-

tem of safeguards in all respects equivalent to those constitutionally enjoined upon
American trials." Id. The sensitivity of states to acts that have the effect of impugning the sovereign power is well known. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (act of state doctrine). See also United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (emphasizing the exclusive competence of the executive branch in the field of foreign affairs); Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at
128 (remarks of Barbara M. Watson, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular
Affairs, referring to the "sensitive problems" that might arise).

30. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
31. More particularly, Toscanino contended that he was lured from his home in
Montevideo, Uruguay, at the direction of a Montevideo policeman acting as a paid
agent of the United States. He alleged that, while accompanied by his pregnant wife,
he met the agent, was knocked unconscious with a gun, thrown into the back seat of a
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared, "The Constitution.

. .

applies only to the conduct abroad of agents acting in

behalf of the United States. It does not govern the independent
conduct of foreign officials in their own country. '32 A clear problem arises, however, when the United States becomes associated
with the foreign conviction by imprisoning the offender in this
country. More specifically, the question is whether this act of imprisonment sufficiently implicates the United States in the conviction to invoke the constitutional requisites of due process for the
trial and conviction.3 3 In a statement before the House Commitcar, blindfolded, and driven to Brazil. There, he claimed, he was interrogated incessantly for 17 days, denied nourishment and sleep, and subjected to torture and brutality, such as the pinching of his fingers with metal pliers, the flushing of alcohol and
other fluids into his eyes, nose, and anal passage, and the passing of jarring jolts of
electricity through his body by means of electrodes attached to his earlobes, toes, and
genitals. Id. at 268-70. Following this alleged period of torture, he was drugged by
Brazilian-American agents and placed on a Pan American flight "destined for the
waiting arms of the United States government." Id. at 270. He further claimed that
the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York was informed regularly of the progress of the interrogation, id. at 270, and that during the interrogation
a member of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was present at one or more intervals as an active participant. The
United States Attorney would not confirm or deny Toscanino's version of the facts,
contending that the mode of Toscanino's apprehension was immaterial. Id See
generally Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886):
"[D]ue process of law" ... is complied with when the party is regularly
indicted by the proper grand jury in the [proper] court, has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in
that trial
and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is
lawfully entitled.
See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1952): "This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois
• . .that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that
he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.'"
32. 500 F.2d at 280 n.9 (citing Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965)). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); Wentz
v. United States, 244 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 806 (1957); House
JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 125.
33. "Whether or not United States officials are substantially involved, or foreigners are acting as their agents or employees, is a question of fact to be resolved in each
case." United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing
Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743-45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960
(1968)). See also United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 847 (1975) (Merely asking the Chilean Government for the arrest and expulsion
of defendant is not sufficient to make the U.S. Government responsible for the torture
of defendant by the Chilean officials, so that defendant may take advantage of the
Toscanino principle that the government may not take advantage of its own denial of
defendant's constitutional rights); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62
(2d Cir.), cert. denied,421 U.S. 1001 (1975); note 88 infra. On remand in Toscanino,
the district court held that the defendant had failed to prove his allegations, and consequently the court would not divest itself of jurisdiction. 398 F. Supp. 916
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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tee on the Judiciary, a federal official argued in the negative, reasoning:
If the 'Great Writ' may not be invoked to prevent extradition to
a country which may not follow procedures compatible with
American notions of constitutional fairness, it would seem logical to conclude that habeas corpus would not be available to a
U.S. 34citizen returned to this country after his foreign conviction.
After examining other situations in which the United States
becomes involved with foreign judgments or procedures, including extradition, procurement of evidence abroad, and enforcement
of foreign judgments, the State Department concurred, in a memorandum of law submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 35 The memorandum concluded that because the rule of noninquiry into foreign process is followed, with the narrow exception
carved out in Toscanino,36 the transfer of prisoners, which "in''37
volves much less of an inroad into the rights of an American,
without concern for due process in the
can also be consummated
38
proceedings.
conviction
34. H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1977), reprintedin [1977] U.S.
& AD. NEWS 3173-74 (statement of Peter F. Flaherty, Deputy Attorney
General, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
35. See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 3, at 209-14 (memorandum of
Detlev F. Vagts); cf.Senate ForeignRelationsHearings,supra note 3, at 114-18 (statement of Alan C. Swan concluding that the foreign entanglement cases are unclear).
See also note 41 infra.
36. See notes 32, 33 & accompanying text supra.
37. Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 214 (memorandum of Detlev F.
Vagts). Professor Vagts continued:
It would obviously be unconstitutional for an American trial abroad to
take place under foreign procedures not known to our Constitution.
Similarly, it would be intolerable to have American trial safeguards circumvented by collusion between American and foreign law enforcement agencies. The transfer arrangement does not affect the quality of
any American trial. A transfer by American authorities to a foreign
government prior to trial ensures that the accused will have neither an
American trial nor American imprisonment. A transfer of a convicted
prisoner back to the United States assures him that he will at least be
confined subject to the protections of the Eighth Amendment. It might
have been preferable in theory to obtain an arrangement providing for
both trial and confinement to be under the auspices of the United
States. However, it is plain that neither country could have accepted a
treaty that made such inroads into its territorial sovereignty. The
Treaty should not be invalidated because, having achieved much for
the prisoners in Mexico, it could not go on to reach their other
problems.
Id. (footnote omitted).
38. See id. On the nature and scope of involvement of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, see, e.g., Senate Foreign RelationsHearings,supra note 3, at 6181; US.Citizens Imprisonedin Mexico.- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on InternationalPoliticalandMilitaryAffairs ofthe House Comm. on InternationalRelations (pt.
I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1975-1976) (statement of Rep. Stark alleging that American
Drug Enforcement Administration officers were present while American prisoners
CODE CONG.
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But these situations may be sufficiently distinguishable. In
extradition cases, for example, the only involvement of the United
States is in removing a person from its jurisdiction to that of another country, so that that country's criminal justice system may
function. 39 Under the Prisoner Exchange Treaty, however, the
40
United States is in fact executing the punishment of a crime
based solely on a foreign conviction, absent an intervening trial or
hearing in the United States to determine probable guilt or innocence, or even to determine whether the foreign trial comported
with rudimentary principles of due process. 4 1 It might be argued,
of course, that confining the foreign offender is akin to enforcing a
foreign judgment. But an obvious distinction can be made between civil and criminal judgments, for if enforcement of the latter type envisions physical custody of the offender, then that
seems to ignore the historic fundamental principle--embodied in
the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process of law-that
before an accused may be imprisoned in this country he must be
were being tortured). An analogous doctrine of complicity in improper proceedings
has developed in the context of the fourth amendment. See generally Robbins &
Sanders, Judicial Integrity, theAppearance of Justice, and the Great Writ of Habeas
Corpus."How to Kill Two-Thirds (orMore) with One Stone, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63,
76-80 (1977).
To my mind the Government in the laudable interest of stopping the
international drug traffic is by these repeated abductions inviting exercise of [the supervisory power of the courts under McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1942), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957), to bar jurisdiction] in the interests of the greater good of
preserving respect for law.
United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 847 (1975).
39. "Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or convicted of a
crime against the law of a state and found in a foreign state are returned by the latter
to the former for trial or punishment." 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 727 (1968). For discussions of the analogy between reciprocal prisoner exchange and the law of extradition, see, e.g., Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at
140-45, 151-54, 173-74 (statements of M. Cherif Bassiouni); House JudiciaryHearings,
supra note 2, at 122, 125, 133-34, 146-47.
40. See generally A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976), reviewed in Robbins, Book Review, Learning by Redoing, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 153 (1977) (discussing the relationship between punishment and rehabilitation).
41. The subject matter of conflict of laws is of clear importance on these issues
involving territorial sovereignty. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra
note 3, at 47; Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 124, 150-58; House Judiciary
Hearings,supra note 2, at 190. See generally Feller, JurisdictionOver Offenses with a
Foreign Element; in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 38-39 (M.
Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International
CriminalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 35 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds.
1965). See also Mueller, InternationalJudicialAssistancein CriminalMatters,7 VILL.
L. REV. 193 (1961-62).
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42
afforded a trial that comports with basic fairness.

Even with domestic cases, states usually will not enforce the

criminal judgments of sister states. 43 Moreover, because the
American court normally has the choice whether to continue the

transferred offender's imprisonment or to free him (based upon

due process violations), one commentator has argued that the de-

cision to follow instead the dictates of the Treaty "is a deliberate

decision by American authority to deprive that prisoner of his lib-

erty."44
In summary, the law on the question whether the United

States becomes so inextricably involved in the foreign conviction
as to invoke due process protections is not definitive, making pertinent the next inquiry, to wit: whether, if there is a colorable due
process challenge to the Mexican conviction, the Treaty constitu-

tionally can prevent the transferees from asserting the claim in
courts of the United States.
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Article I of the United States Constitution reads in part: "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,

B.

unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety

may require it.' ' 4 5 If the Treaty does act as a suspension of
46 What is
habeas corpus, then it plainly violates the Constitution.
47 operates as a susless evident is whether article VI of the Treaty
42. See 123 CONG. REC. S12,549 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) (individual views of
Sen. Griffin).
43. This is precisely one reason for having extradition. See U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2; cf Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (dealing with enforcement of foreign laws, rather than
execution of foreign judgments).
44. Senate Foreign RelationsHearings,supra note 3, at 102 (statement of Alan C.
Swan). Professor Swan continued: "The consequences that flow from freeing a prisoner may merit his continued imprisonment. But the court cannot deny that the
imprisonment is an act of the American government merely because a foreign government precipitated the necessity of the choice [to continue the deprivation of liberty]."
Id. (footnote omitted). Furthermore, "if our system imprisons people wholly on the
strength of a foreign proceeding without any intervening trial according to constitutional standards, it would be anomalous indeed if 'fairness and decency' in those proceedings was a matter to which our constitution was indifferent." Id. at 107.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
46. No congressional witness argued that the problem of drug possession, distribution, and smuggling was a matter concerning "public safety" in the sense connoted
by the suspension clause, though presumably such an argument might be received by
the judiciary with other than deaf ears. See note 86 infra. See generally Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1263-74 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. For a discussion of the kinds of clauses present
in state constitutions, see Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States--1776-1865,32 U. CHI.
L. REV. 243, 249-55 (1965).
47. The Treaty provides in pertinent part: "The Transferring State shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to chal-
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pension.48
One of the difficulties encountered in debating aspects of the
writ of habeas corpus is that the intent of the framers is unclear. 49
Although mentioned in the Constitution, habeas corpus is not
enumerated, except by negative inference, as a constitutional
guarantee. 50 It is true that the suspension clause gives rise to the
assumption that the framers recognized the importance of the
writ, but nowhere does the Constitution define or compel its use.
This ambiguity is further complicated by the fact that the
negative form of the clause was no accident of wording. Positive
affirmations of a right to habeas corpus were proposed at the Constitutional Convention, 51 in subsequent ratifying conventions, 52
and in contemporary commentary.53 Yet all such proposals were
rejected, reflecting perhaps an intent to leave habeas review entirely to the states, 54 or, alternatively, an intent to support a constilenge, modify or set aside sentences handed down by its courts." Treaty, supra note
1, at art. VI.
48. "The suspension clause, so simple in appearance, is fraught with confusion.
Those few cases which have dealt with it provide little interpretive guidance; commentators have largely ignored it. Consequently, conclusions in this area must be
tentative." Developments, supra note 46, at 1263.
49. There has been surprisingly little attention given to this aspect of the study of
the writ. See R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 196 (2d ed. 1969). Further, the
exact origin of the habeas writ is open to dispute. See, e.g., Jenks, The Story of the
Habeas Corpus, 18 LAW Q. REV. 64 (1902); Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding
Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1948). For extended treatment tracing its development from the Magna Carta, see Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum
Causa-The Emergence ofthe Modern Writ, 18 CAN. B. REV. (pts. 1-2) 10, 172 (1940);
Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAN. B. REV. 92
(1938).
50. The limiting nature of the clause is suggested both by its wording and by its
location in article I, section 9, which otherwise consists of an enumeration of limitations.
51. See 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
341, 438 (1911).
52. See, e.g., 1 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (New York), 334 (Rhode
Island) (2d ed. 1836).
53. See, e.g., 4 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 476 (Ford ed. 1892). In England, suspension was by Parliament:
Suspension in England meant an act of Parliament which had the
effect of making the Act of 1679 [31 Car. II, c. 2] temporarily inoperative, usually as to a limited class of persons such as those suspected of
treason against the King. Persons in the suspect class could be held
without any formal charge and without any right to habeas corpus.
Collings, Habeas Corpusfor Convicts--Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40
CALIF.

L.

REV.

335, 339 (1952).

54. The absence of affirmative protection for habeas corpus, combined with the
power of Congress to choose or refuse to create lower federal courts and to determine
their jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2; see Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1868) (Congress can at least partially abolish the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction on habeas corpus); Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94-95
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tutional requirement that there be some court with habeas

jurisdiction over federal prisoners. 55 An early indication by the
Supreme Court of the importance of the writ was Chief Justice

Marshall's characterization of habeas corpus as a "great constitutional privilege"; 5 6 and more recently the Court has declared that
"at all events it would appear that the Constitution invites, if it

does not compel, a generous construction of the power of the fed-

eral courts to dispense the writ conformably with the common-law
58 It is
practice, ' 57 with which the framers were certainly familiar.
not clear, however, whether their reference was to the remedy as it

the prohibition
existed in the eighteenth century, or whether 59
against suspension envisioned a broader concept.

(1807) (dictum) (Congress can wholly or partially withhold habeas jurisdiction from
the lower federal courts), has been invoked in support of the contention that Congress
need never have established any federal habeas jurisdiction at all. See Collings,
supra note 53, at 344, 351. See also note 64 infra.
55. See, e.g., R. HURD, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 122 (Albany 1858). See
also 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 213; THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton), at
578-79 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Brant, The Madison Heritage,in THE GREAT RIGHTS 13,
31 (E. Cahn ed. 1963).
56. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). But again, Marshall did
not term it a "right." However, the debate in the Constitutional Convention that
resulted in the suspension clause indicates that the interest was in making special
provision for the protection of the "Great Writ," id., rather than in granting a special
power for eliminating it. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 438.
57. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963) (citation omitted). See also note 64
infra.
58. See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 297-98; THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A.

Hamilton), at 578-79 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
59. The growth of habeas corpus from 1789, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
14, 1 Stat. 81, to the last decade has generally proceeded not as an interpretation of
constitutional rights, but rather as interpretations of the habeas corpus statutes. See,
e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Thus, it might be supposed that, in the absence of constitutional compulsion, what
Congress has given it may take away. See, e.g., Marchese v. United States, 304 F.2d
154, 156 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated, 374 U.S. 101, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965) (suspension clause protects only rights of habeas as of 1789) (quoting Jones v. Squier, 195
F.2d 179, 181 (9th Cir. 1952) (proper test for suspension is scope of writ in 1789)). It
appears that this view was taken by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in support
unsuccessful attempt to curtail federal habeas corpus review of state convictions,
of its
as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

2112, 2152-53. On the other hand, it would be misleading to attribute all the expansion of habeas jurisdiction to congressional impetus. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963); Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw andFederalHabeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 500-01 (1963); cf.McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131,
135-36 (1934), overruledon other grounds, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (habeas
corpus to be interpreted according to common law principles); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309, 331 (1915) (Congress has power to liberalize common law habeas corpus).
See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1968), reprintedin [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2220 (minority report). This line of argument would per-

mit the conclusion that it is the nature of the writ that it grow and adapt to new
conditions. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 35-39, United States v. Hayman, 342
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In an extensive examination of the history of the writ, the

Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia60 concluded that at the time the

suspension clause was inserted into the Constitution, habeas

corpus was available at common law to remedy any type of governmental restraint in contradiction of fundamental rights. 6 1 The
Court further suggested that the drafters of the Constitution did
not intend to imply that, if the judiciary did not give habeas its

full common law embodiment, the suspension clause would be violated.62 If the drafters had intended to protect only a specific
form of the remedy, they could have included a definition, 63 for

habeas corpus had long been recognized in the Anglo-American
tradition as the one final and most important protection of individual liberty against arbitrary governmental action: "Over the
centuries [habeas corpus] has been the common law world's 'free-

dom writ' by whose orderly processes the production of a prisoner
in court may be required and the legality of the grounds for his
incarceration inquired into, failing which the prisoner is set
free."

64

U.s. 205 (1952). See also R. HURD, supra note 55, at 144 ("Employed to vindicate
the right of personal liberty by whatever power infringed, [the writ of habeas corpus]
became inseparably associated with that right; and in proportion as the right was
valued, so was the writ by which it was defended."). For a case recognizing a right to
petition for habeas relief, see Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d.788 (6th Cir. 1967), discussed
in notes 196-99 & accompanying text infra.
60. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
61. See id. at 404-06.
62. Id. at 406. The Judiciary Act of 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, and subsequent
amendments expanded habeas corpus to include "every possible case of privation of
liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to
widen this jurisdiction." Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867),
quoted with approval in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963).
63. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963); McNally v. Hill,
293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968).
64. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961). "Habeas corpus is one of the
precious heritages of Anglo-American civilization." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441
(1963). It is a writ of "the largest liberty." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151
(1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence). "It must never be forgotten that the writ of
habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty, and there is no higher
duty than to maintain it unimpaired." Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
"IHabeascorpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure.
It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although
every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more
than an empty shell." Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also notes 196-99 & accompanying text infra. Speaking on the affect
on habeas corpus of the Prisoner Exchange Treaty, one senator referred to the writ as
"a cornerstone of ourjurisprudence." Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 130
(statement of Sen. Mathias). Another called it "a basic right which is the most fundamental right in our Constitution." Id. at 305 (statement of Sen. Biden). See
generally Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT
RIGHTS 41, 43-44 (E. Cahn ed. 1963); Chafee, The Most ImportantHuman Right in the
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Arguably, then, the framers' purpose was to assure the con-

tinuing availability of a forum to consider questions of illegal detention. 65 Yet the suspension clause has been one of the least

litigated provisions of the Constitution. Only two circumstances
have joined the issue: war waged on United States territory and

the Federal Habeas Corpus Act. 66 The former cases provide minimal guidance for defining jurisdiction, for they were direct suspensions and were held to be valid cases of suspension because of
68 The more difficult
war, 67 or to be invalid for other reasons.
Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REV. 143 (1952); Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas
Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605.
It would be improper, however, to overlook the fact that the Supreme Court
recently has narrowed the scope of the writ, although it has asserted the contrary.
See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 n.37 (1976) (a state prisoner may not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial where the state has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim).
See generally Boyte, FederalHabeasCorpus After Stone v. Powell: 4 Remedy Onlyfor
theArguably Innocent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 291 (1977); Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism. Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); McFeeley,
Habeas Corpus and Due Process. From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 533
(1976); Robbins & Sanders, note 38 supra. This direction had been foreshadowed for
several years, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 258 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 234, 237 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Bator, note 59 supra; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral,4ttackon
CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970), and recently has been manifested
in several cases, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501, 513 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233
(1973), culminating with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (rule barring federal habeas review absent a showing of "cause" and "prejudice" applied to failure to
object contemporaneously to the admission of a confession). In Wainwright the
Court said:
We leave open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition
of the "cause"-and-"prej udice" standard, and note here only that it is
narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia ....
which would make federal habeas review generally available to state
convicts absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the federal constitutional contention. It is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, going far
beyond the facts of the case eliciting it, which we today reject.
433 U.S. at 87-88 (footnote omitted).
65. For divergent discussion of the historic role of federal habeas corpus, see
Bator, supra note 59, at 468; Brennan, FederalHabeas Corpus andState Prisoners."An
Exercise in Federalism,7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Friendly, supra note 64, at 17071; Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreward"The Time Chartof the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus,
64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966); Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus. Impact ofan Abortive
State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315 (1961).

66.
67.
U.S. (4
68.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1976).
See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Exparte Milligan, 71
Wall.) 2 (1866).
E.g., Exparte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487)

(Congress alone can suspend). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1513-14 (2d ed. 1973).
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cases involve laws that are suspensive only in effect, such as the
cases dealing with the Federal Habeas Corpus Act.
Section 2255 of the Act, which creates a federal post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners substantially the same as the

federal habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners, 69 prohibits a litigant from successfully applying for habeas relief70 unless he has
applied for section 2255 relief and it appears that the remedy by
motion "is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his de-

tention.

71

The Supreme Court has never explicitly considered

the constitutionality of this provision,7 2 but neither has it disturbed lower court rulings that have upheld its constitutionality.
In St. Clair v. Hiatt,73 for example, the federal district court applied a strict scrutiny test to a section 2255 case, because habeas
corpus was being restricted.74 The court held, however, that the

exhaustion restrictions were merely procedural requirements that,
for justifiable reasons, only temporarily delayed the use of habeas;
therefore, they did not constitute a suspension. 75
In United States v. Anselmi, 76 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also concluded that section 2255 was
69. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962); United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952); Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510, 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950); S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
70. Such an application would be made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) (para. 7); cf.28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) (absence of
process or circumstances rendering such process ineffective required).
72. But see Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 379-84 (1977) (the substitution of a
collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a
person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus);
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19, 223 (1952).
73. 83 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 967 (1950).
74. The Court has mandated the utilization of the "strict scrutiny" test, rather
than a "rational basis" test, when fundamental rights are restricted. The principal
source of such rights as against the federal government is the Bill of Rights. The
Court also has found fundamental constitutional rights lying in the "penumbras" of
the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Constitution includes rights that are "necessary to make the express guarantees fully
meaningful"). The principal source of fundamental rights as against the states is the
fourteenth amendment. At first, the Court found that amendment's due process
clause to protect only those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," e.g.,
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 793-94 (1969), which "inhere in the very idea of free government." E.g.,
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). But the Court has not stopped there,
finding additional fundamental rights in the history and traditions of Anglo-American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-19
(1925). See generally Note, OfInterests, Fundamentaland Compelling- The Emerging
Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. REV. 462, 470 (1977).
75. 83 F. Supp. 585, 586-87 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
76. 207 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902 (1954).
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constitutional, but it based the decision on the fact that the remedy by motion was substantially the equivalent of habeas corpus:
"So long as there is open to the prisoner an adequate and effective
of the writ to withremedy in one court,. . . it is not a suspension
77
courts.
federal
other
hold jurisdiction from
Another federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a), which provides
that habeas cannot successfully be raised to challenge a deportation order unless the judicial proceedings were inadequate or inef78
fective to test the validity of the order, has also been contested as

an invalid suspension of the writ. Although in deportation cases
there is no procedure being substituted for habeas corpus, as there

is with section 2255 proceedings, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States ex rel Tanfara v.
Esperdy,79 held against suspension on the grounds that the proce-

dure merely limited and did not eliminate access to habeas corpus
80
and that Congress had sound reasons for such a limitation.
These cases apparently do not require full access to the rem-

edy of habeas corpus as long as some remedy or means of relief is
available to the prisoner. As the Supreme Court signalled in the
context of restricting habeas corpus for state prisoners when available state judicial remedies had not yet been exhausted:
[W]here resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full
and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either
because the State affords no remedy. . . or because in the particular case the remedy afforded by State law proves in practice
77. Id. at 314. See also Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 897 (1950); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1949). Ironically, the
court added that, in any event, the petitioner had not been prejudiced by the action of
the district court in denying him the writ, for he had a full opportunity to raise all of
his claims on his prior section 2255 motion. Cf. note 64 supra (discussing the broad
sweep of the writ). For a criticism of the section 2255 cases, see, e.g., Note, Section
2255 of the Judicial Code.- The Threatened Demise of Habeas Corpus, 59 YALE L.J.
1183 (1950).
78. Section 1105a(c) reads in part:
No petition for review or for habeas corpus shall be entertained if the
validity of the order has been previously determined in any civil or
criminal proceeding, unless the petition presents grounds which the
court finds could not have been presented in such prior proceeding, or
the court finds that the remedy provided by such prior proceeding was
inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the order.
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1976).
79. 347 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1965).
80. "The limitation of the writ to cases where the statutory exceptions do not
apply and the administrative decision has not been judicially reviewed serves to conserve institutional resources by preventing repetitious litigation and securing the finality so necessary in a workable judicial system." ld. at 152. Cf. Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (indicating that the number of applications for relief is unlimited as long as prior applications were not adjudicated on the merits or new applications are based on new grounds and the petitioner has not otherwise abused the
remedy).
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unavailable or seriously inadequate. . . a federal court should
entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless.8 1

Nevertheless, the suspension clause cases leave the issue somewhat in a state of suspension. 82 A statute that defacto or dejure
forbids anyone access to the writ of habeas corpus undoubtedly
would be suspensive. The above-noted provision of 2255 is sus-

pensive dejure, but it is viewed merely as a procedural limitation.
The deportation statute even further diminishes the prohibition
against suspension, because no equivalent of habeas corpus is provided.

Finally, the exhaustion-of-remedy cases suggest that the

finding of some alternative form of remedy is sufficient to prevent
a limitation from constituting a suspension. But, in all of these
cases, there is one distinguishing factor, a safety valve: access to
habeas corpus is restricted unless the remedy provided is inadequate or ineffective.
The Prisoner Exchange Treaty in pertinent part provides that
"[tlhe Transferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any
proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge, modify or set aside sentences handed down by its courts. 8 3 Although

this section obviously precludes American habeas actions contesting the conviction, it does leave open to the prisoner Mexican
collateral challenges, most notably that of amparo.84 Keeping to
81. Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944). Although its emphasis may be
different, this statement is not dissimilar to much of the language of Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976). See note 64 supra. For example, the Court held that because
the state courts had "provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the]
Fourth Amendment claim," 428 U.S. at 481-82, 494, federal habeas corpus relief may
not be granted. See id. at 482, 494 & n.37. See also Robbins & Sanders, supra note
38, at 74-76. It should be noted that the Constitution requires that states have a postconviction remedy by which prisoners may raise claims of denial of federal rights.
Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949). For
recent expositions on the nature of the requirement of exhaustion of such remedies,
see, e.g., Smith v. Digmon, 98 S. Ct. 597 (1978); Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482
(1975); Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270
(1971).
82. See generally Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 3, at 103-23
(statement of Alan C. Swan); House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 226-30 (statement of Charles F. Abernathy); Note, ConstitutionalProblems in the Execution of Foreign PenalSentences.- The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1500 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Problems].
83. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI.
84. See generally J. HERGET & J. CAMIL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEXICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM (1978); Clagett, The Mexican Suit of "Amparo," 33 GEO. L.J. 418
(1945); Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America,, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 785 (1974);
Schwarz, Rights andRemedies in the FederalDistrict Courts of Mexico and the United
States, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67 (1977); Robbins, A Study of the Mexican
Amparo Suit as a Post-Conviction Remedy (1978) (unpublished manuscript, to be
published in book entitled COMPARATIVE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES). Challenges can also be brought in Mexico by way of necessary indulto, see House Judiciary
Hearings,supra note 2, at 40, but that remedy is applicable only to claims of inno-
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one side for the moment the practical difficulties involved for an
a Mexican
American prisoner in a United States prison contesting
85 the prisoner
conviction with a Mexican procedure 86in Mexico,
clearly is afforded some form of relief. On the other hand, it is
habeas
cence. Id. In addition, of course, the prisoner may still bring an American
accompa&
19
note
See
itself.
Treaty
the
of
constitutionality
the
action challenging
nying text supra. See also note 24 supra; note 93 infra.
3, at 124,
85. For such material, see, e.g., Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note

four
273 ("I am so confused as to the Mexican procedures. We have gone through
....
different attorneys. We have received no legal documents about our son's case
mother of prisSo I am completely in the dark.") (statement of Lynell F. Marshall,

oner); House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 2, at 151. See generally Constitutional
Problems, supra note 82, at 1518-20 (listing such problems as "nearly insuperable"
the relief for a
evidentiary obstacles, difficulty of obtaining foreign judicial assistance,

princisuccessful petition being a new trial in Mexico, international conflict of laws
ples, and general noncooperation).
86. Further support for the Treaty provisions against a challenge that it suspends
the privilege might also derive from Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807),
and Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).

In BollmanChief Justice

and in
Marshall stated that the power to issue the writ must be legislatively provided,
direct
McCardle, Chief Justice Chase recognized the authority of Congress to restrict
JusChief
However,
cases.
habeas
over
Court
Supreme
appellate jurisdiction of the
tice Marshall noted that:
It may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first
congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had
declared "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be
suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety might require it."
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must
have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient
means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life
and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself
would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.
Under the impression of this obligation, they give to all the courts the
power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.
Yerger, 75
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95. Soon after McCardle, the Court decided Exparte
questions
habeas
review
to
authority
its
affirmed
it
which
in
(1868),
85
Wall.)
(8
U.S.
to permit
cases
these
read
would
courts
the
whether
on certiorari. It is questionable
ofjurisdicsuspension of the type called for in the Treaty, which involves withdrawal
tion without any approximately equivalent relief available.
It might also be thought that the clause should be interpreted only as a restriction
but the
of executive suspension of the privilege of the writ. This is accurate in part,
provided-i.e.,
constitutionally
are
suspend
may
Congress
which
circumstances under
the
"when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." Neither Ex
Executive, nor Congress, nor the Judiciary may otherwise suspend the privilege.
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)'2, 125 (1866); Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144,
difficult to
148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Congress has not declared-and it is
by
required
Treaty
the
by
privilege
the
of
declare-suspension
would
it
believe that
supra.
46
note
See
invasion.
or
public safety in the case of rebellion
Thus, it would seem that the Treaty may not bar relief through issuance of a writ
The
of habeas corpus in any case where such relief would otherwise be appropriate.
question of whether Article VI of the Treaty would otherwise operate as an unconstione.
tutional withdrawal of jurisdiction from the federal courts is a more difficult
plenary
has
Congress
that
proposition
the
While there is substantial data to support
authority over the original jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts and the appellate
U.S. (7
jurisdiction of all federal courts, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, I I
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arguable that the fatal flaw is the lack of a safety valve, for the

Treaty prohibits all collateral attacks on the Mexican conviction
in the United States-not just those in which it can be shown that
the remedies afforded in Mexico are adequate.8 7
C.

Waiver of Habeas Corpus

One provision may avoid the problem of suspension altogether-the consent requirement of the Treaty.88 Imprisonment
Cranch) 32, 33 (1812); Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807); Turner v.
Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799), there is considerable scholarly
commentary to the contrary. E.g., Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict
Lower FederalCourt Jurisdiction,83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the JurisdictionofLower FederalCourts 4 CriticalReview and
a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975). The exercise of congressional legislative authority over the jurisdiction of the federal courts seems most constitutionally
suspect where it attempts to foreclose any judicial relief from constitutional violations. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746 (1974), cited with
approval in Feinberg v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 522 F.2d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150, 1163
n.31 (D. Del. 1975); text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
While the exercise of the treaty-making power, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18;
art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 1; art. III, § 2, cl. 1; art. VI, cl. 2, may permit the
exercise of governmental authority that otherwise would not be constitutionally possible, see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the treaty-making power may not
overcome the Constitution's express restrictions on federal governmental action. See
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). In the case of Article VI of the Treaty, if Congress
could not completely withdraw the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain constitutional challenges to federal action because of the express restrictions of the due process clause or the eighth amendment, it is difficult to understand how such a result
could constitutionally be reached under the treaty power. (Since this issue concerns
the jurisdiction of the courts, it could not be waived by consenting to the transfer.)
Although the courts ordinarily will interpret a treaty's provisions with an eye to
preserving the intent of the signatories, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas
Peruanasa, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963), interpretation of a treaty's provisions is similar to contract and statutory interpretation in many
other respects. See, e.g., National Indian Youth Council v. Bruce, 485 F.2d 97 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1973). Thus, courts may be expected to avoid an
interpretation that results in conflict between the Treaty and the Constitution, where
possible. It is possible to avoid this issue by interpreting Article VI as no impediment
to federal court jurisdiction over challenges based on the constitutionality of federal
incarceration. See note 19 & accompanying text supra. Although this may seem
contrary to the intent of the signatories, the Treaty, itself, offers some support:
The fact that an offender has been transferred under the provisions
of this Treaty shall not prejudice his civil rights in the Receiving State
in any way beyond those ways in which the fact of his conviction in the
Transferring State by itself effects such prejudice under the laws of the
Receiving State or any State thereof.
Treaty, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 6.
87. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1977), reprinted
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 3164-65 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976)).
88. The position of the Justice Department is that even if United States involvement in the foreign conviction triggers a due process right to test the fairness of the
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the
in the United States to a certain extent is voluntary, because
89 Profesprisoner must give his consent before being transferred.
sor Herbert Wechsler testified before the Senate Foreign Rela-

tions Committee on the relationship between consent and

suspension: "This is not a suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus. The writ remains available; it simply is a good

return that the offender is imprisoned in accordance with the
90
Another witness
treaty and its implementing legislation."
before the Committee commented: "[I]t is important to make a

distinction between a waiver of habeas corpus by a prisoner who

would otherwise have the right, and suspension of the privilege of
9 1 Thus, although on its face the
the writ by the Government."
Treaty prohibits access to habeas corpus for a certain class of peo-

ple, it arguably offers prisoners a beneficial exchange: imprison-

a
ment in the United States rather than in Mexico, in return for 92
conviction.
Mexican
the
to
waiver of habeas corpus challenges
the extent to which the waiver can be
The exacting query concerns
93
said to be voluntary.
In order to ascertain whether the prisoner's express "consent
to the transfer is given voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
foreign proceeding in either a state or federal court of the United States, the consent
procedures are constitutionally adequate to establish a waiver of that right. See, e.g.,
House Judiciary Hearings,supra note 2, at 125 (statement of Peter F. Flaherty).
89. "If the Authority of the Transferring State fmds the transfer of an offender
appropriate, and if the offender gives his express consent for his transfer, said Authority shall transmit a request for transfer, through diplomatic channels, to the Authority
of the Receiving State." Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, para. 2.
90. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3, at 93-94 (statement of Herbert Wechsler). Professor Wechsler continued:
We may, perhaps, regret that a judicial review of the conviction for
denial of justice in the international sense . . . is not permitted by the
[Treaty]. It is, however, wholly understandable that this may not have
been attainable in the negotiations with ...Mexico or that we ourselves, indeed, would not be willing to subject our judgments to such an
assessment by a Mexican . . .tribunal.
Id. at 94.
91. Id. at 170 (statement of Michael Chertof); see notes 236-39 & accompanying
text infra.
92. This is by no means to imply that imprisonment in the United States in itself
is desirable. See, e.g., Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1978) ("When the
history of our criminal justice system is chronicled, no doubt one of its most sobering
pages will describe the sad state of this nation's prisons and jails"); See generally
Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement. An Analysis of Pugh v.
Locke and FederalCourt Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth
Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1977). See also TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-

TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 4 (1967).
93. Of course, an American court on habeas corpus could still entertain allegations that the consent was not actually voluntary or informed, that there was no consent, or that the Treaty otherwise had not been complied with in the procedures
followed. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(b)(3) (West Supp. 1978).
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consequences thereof, ' 94 the consent may be verified by the receiving state prior to the transfer. 95 The enabling legislation en-

acted by Congress 96 is more specific, requiring that the offender
understand particular consequences of the transfer, including the
fact that he will not be able to challenge the conviction in a court
of the United States. 97 Although never explicitly labelled as such
in the Treaty or legislation, this consent apparently serves as a

waiver of habeas corpus. 98 Hence, in determining the validity of
this provision, three issues must be addressed: (1) whether habeas
corpus can be waived; (2) if so, whether the procedures provided

by the Treaty constitute a valid waiver; and (3) whether the transfer is an unconstitutional condition on the habeas corpus right.
1. The permissibility of a waiver
The general proposition that one can waive a right to which
he is otherwise entitled is uncontroverted. 99 When fundamental
94. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 1.
95. Id.
96. See note 5 supra.
97. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(b)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
98. See House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 267; ConstitutionalProblems,
supra note 82, at 1523. One congressional witness testified that the waiver situation
was not a proper analogy, citing Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (per curiam),
which stated that "[a] sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses
against its laws committed within its borders unless it expressly or impliedly consents
to surrender its jurisdiction." 354 U.S. at 529. Thus, an argument can be made that
it surrenders only the custody of the offender, because Mexico has not waived its
jurisdiction over the offense. See House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 216, 218
(statement of John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas). This is an overly simplistic
view, however, for part of the problem is whether due process rights are triggered by
the United States accepting custody. See notes 28-44 & accompanying text supra.
Another commentator has read the consent provision to invoke not a waiver of
habeas corpus but rather of the right to a constitutional trial, concluding that it was
impermissible on the ground that a right cannot be waived after it has been violated.
Comment, Execution of Foreign Sentences in the UnitedStates A Treaty with Mexico,
9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 118, 132 (1977). Certainly this can be true only in the narrow
sense that a right has not been violated until a court so states. See, e.g., Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is"), quoted with approval in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974); Speech of Chief Justice Hughes before
the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, Elmira, N.Y., May 3, 1907, in C. HUGHES, ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 1906-1916, at 179, 185 (2d ed. 1916) ("[T]he
Constitution is what the judges say it is..."). Even a casual knowledge of the law
of guilty pleas, according to which all nonjurisdictional defects are waived, defeats the
argument that a right cannot be waived after it has been violated. See, e.g.,
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258
(1973); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). But cf. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420
U.S. 283 (1975) (no waiver of non-jurisdictional claims on federal habeas corpus if
under special state practice a state appeal lies after a valid plea of guilty). On the
relationship between "consent" and "waiver," see, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (search and seizure).
99. See, e.g., Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641 (1898); Phillips v. Payne, 92
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rights are concerned, however, there has always been an attitude
of great caution regarding waiver. 100 A principle of law often repeated by the Supreme Court is that "courts indulge every reason-

able presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional

rights." 10 1 This concern is based not on any doubt that a person
has the capacity to waive rights, but instead on a realization that
many pressures can be brought to bear, particularly on a criminal
defendant or prisoner, that might lessen his ability to waive. A
waiver under such pressure would give the appearance of a waiver
when102in reality the consent given was coerced rather than voluntary.
There are many cases in which specific constitutional rights
to counsel, 10 3
have been held to be waivable-including the right
05
right to confrontation,1° right to be free from double jeopardy,
106 In fact, all constitutional and statuand right to trial by jury.
tory claims have been held waivable except attacks on the jurisdiction of the court' 0 7 and a review of the voluntariness of the
waiver itself.'0 8 There also are cases dealing with the waiver of
habeas corpus: those cases, however, are less readily susceptible
of analysis, for habeas is a purely procedural right and, therefore,
rarely is openly abandoned. 09 With the exhaustion-of-state-judiU.S. 130 (1875). It would be remiss at this point not to mention that the term "right"
has many meanings. See Holifeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptionsas Applied inJudicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). See also Cook,
Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721 (1919).
100. Cf note 74 supra (discussing fundamental rights in the context of the "strict
scrutiny" test).
101. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)); accord,Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1,
4 (1966); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 (1955); Hodges v. Easton, 106
U.S. 408, 412 (1882). But cf.Dean v. North Carolina, 269 F. Supp. 986 (M.D.N.C.
1967) (mem.) (barred by laches after 18 years).
102. A prime example of this concern is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(self-incrimination). See also note 132 & accompanying text infra. Of course, issues
of coercion and voluntariness are merely ones of degree, "[b]ut the fact that a line has
to be drawn somewhere does not justify its being drawn anywhere. The line must
follow some direction of policy, whether rooted in logic or experience. Lines should
not be drawn simply for the sake of drawing lines." Pearce v. Commissioner, 315
U.S. 543, 558 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also notes 172, 278 infra.
103. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
104. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
105. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
106. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
107. See note 98 supra. See also Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934);
United States v. Spada, 331 F.2d 995, 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 865 (1964).
108. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
109. Professor Dix presents an interesting analysis of waiver, distinguishing three
issues that commonly are applied to potential waivers: (1) whether a procedural right
should be available in the given situation; (2) whether the defendant utilized the appropriate means of implementing a right; and (3) whether the defendant articulated a
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cial-remedies doctrine," 0 for example, the prisoner indirectly
waives the right to habeas corpus by failing to exhaust available
and effective state procedures." '
In the landmark case of Fay v. Noia,"12 it was held, inter alia,
that if a petitioner deliberately bypasses the state procedure, the
federal remedy is deemed to be waived.' 3 More recently, in
Wainwright v. Sykes," 14 it was held that a failure to comply with
state contemporaneous objection rules is deemed to be a waiver of
federal habeas corpus absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance and prejudice resulting therefrom."l 5 Under the Prisoner
Exchange Treaty, however, the waiver of collateral attack in
American courts is an express one. Although it is difficult to
draw a functional analogy to the foregoing habeas waiver cases,
there is general agreement that habeas corpus, like other rights,
can be waived. The more critical inquiry is whether the procedures provided by the Treaty constitute a valid waiver.
2.

Requisites of a valid waiver of habeas corpus

If the prisoner's express consent, required by article IV, section 2 of the Treaty," 6 is to operate as a valid waiver of the right
to habeas corpus relief, it must meet the United States Supreme
Court's test for a legitimate waiver. The oft-cited standard was
7
first set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst:"1
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of
whether there has been an intelligent waiver. . . must depend,
in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the [one who is to be charged with the waiver]." 8
conscious willingness to forego a right. Dix, Waiver in CriminalProcedure.ABrieffor
More CarefulAnalysis, 55 TEx. L. REV. 193, 205-13 (1977). See also Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, ProceduralDefault and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1978).
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1976). See also notes 69-77 & accompanying

text supra.
111. See generally Developments, supra note 46, at 1093-1112.
112. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
113. Id. at 438-39. See generally note 64 supra.
114. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
115. Id. at 90-91. See generally note 64 supra.
116. See note 89 supra.
117. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
118. Id. at 464. Subsequent quotations of this classic statement frequently omit
the qualifying expression, "is ordinarily." See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439
(1963). There is some question whether Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), see
note 64 supra, which rejected much of Fay v. Noia, has altered the waiver standard.
See note 162 infra. However, even it if does limit the indirect waiver standard, it is
likely that the stricter standard still would be applied in prisoner transfer situations.
In any event, Sykes is limited, at least for the present, to failure to object contemporaneously at trial. See 433 U.S. at 91-94 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Although some
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Motivated by a concern that the Treaty withstand constitutional
challenge," 9 Congress interpreted this standard strictly: before a
prisoner can be transferred, his consent must be verified to be

"voluntary and with full knowledge of the consequences
thereof."

20

a. Knowledge. It is well-settled law that a right cannot be
waived if the criminal defendant has no knowledge that the right
exists.' 2 ' The more troublesome issue concerns the extent of
awareness of a
knowledge required. At its base, there must be an
22

For the more
choice between asserting and waiving a right.'
guilty, 23 an
of
plea
a
in
involved
those
as
important waivers, such

awareness of the formal legal impact of the options may also be

required.' 24 The Treaty's implementing legislation requires only
25
some specific degree of awareness regarding the consequences;
constitutional rights other than habeas corpus have been held to less stringent waiver
requirements than those enunciated in Johnson Y.Zerbst, the "knowing and voluntary" standard has always been required for those guarantees necessary to preserve a
fair trial. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 94 n. I (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1973) (suggesting that
the Johnson v. Zerbst standard may not extend beyond the "fair trial" context).
119. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 62-63, 124-25, 274-75,
324. "Other agencies that will be testifying today, the State Department for one,
discusses [sic] the constitutionality and indicates [sic] that one of the reasons they are
so sure it is constitutional is because the Justice Department is so sure of that." Id. at
62 (remarks of Sen. Biden).
120. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(a) (West Supp. 1978).
121. Eg., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Smith v. O'Grady, 312
U.S. 329 (1941).
122. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 292 F.2d 346, 347 (7th Cir. 1961), cert.'
denied, 369 U.S. 877 (1962) (citing Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927)).
123. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
124. One example is the requirement that the defendant be aware of the possibility
of receiving a special parole term, pursuant to either section 841(b)(1)(A) or section
960(b)(2) of title 21. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(l)(A), 960(b)(2) (1976). See, e.g., United
States v. Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1978);
United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1976). In one recent Supreme Court
case, the defendant was required to have knowledge that intent was an element of
second degree murder, but not of manslaughter, in order for a plea of guilty to the
former to be held valid. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 639, 644-47 (1976).
The verifying officer shall inquire of the offender whether he un125.
derstands and agrees that the transfer will be subject to the following
conditions:
(1) only the country in which he was convicted and sentenced can
modify or set aside the conviction or sentence, and any proceedings seeking such action may only be brought in that
country;
(2) the sentence shall be carried out according to the laws of the
United States and that those laws are subject to change;
(3) if a United States court should determine upon a proceeding
initiated by him or on his behalf that his transfer was not accomplished in accordance with the treaty or laws of the
United States, he may be returned to the country which im-

UCL4 L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1

in practice, a detailed inquiry is to be made of each prisoner. 26
b. Voluntariness. Although the law with respect to the
knowledge requirement for an effective waiver is relatively clear,
the law relating to the voluntariness standard is quite amorphous.
The confusion derives from the perplexity involved in determining the degree of certain types of "influence" that can be tolerated
before a decision leans to the latter end of the voluntariness-coercion spectrum. 127 In essence, two types of influences come into
play: those that include improper or illegal actions by officials,
such as physical beating in order to obtain a confession, 28 and
those in which the lack of voluntariness is a result of the individual having no meaningful choice to make. Because of its subtlety,
the latter type of influence unquestionably is more difficult to perceive; only to the extent that the alternative to waiver is not viable
can the choice be said to be less meaningful and, therefore, less
posed the sentence for the purpose of completing the sentence
if that country requests his return; and
(4) his consent to transfer, once verified by the verifying officer,
is irrevocable.
18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(b) (West Supp. 1978).
126. See Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 26-27. Further, each prisoner
was given a Department of Justice information booklet regarding the operation of the
Treaty. See House Judiciary Hearings,supra note 2, at 32-116. If the government
erred, it was on the cautious and conservative side. See, e.g., id. at 36, Question 4.
But faced with the possibility of returning to the United States within a few days of
the verification proceedings, see id. at 54, Question 65, a meaningful choice may be
absent.
127. See note 102 supra; notes 201-03 & accompanying text infra. The classic
statement of the standard of voluntariness, made in the context of its application to
out-of-court confessions, is that enunciated by Justice Frankfurter in Culombe i.
Connecticut:
Each of [the] factors, in company with all of the surrounding circumstances . . . is relevant. The ultimate test remains . . . the test of
voluntariness. Is the [decision] the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker?. . . If. . . his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the
[decision is invalid]. . . . The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the [decision].
367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (footnote omitted). Chief Justice Warren, who recognized
that Justice Frankfurter was attempting to consolidate and clarify the standard of
voluntariness in the context of confessions, commented insightfully upon the likely
impact of this effort:
[W]hile three members of the Court agree to the general principles
enunciated by the opinion [of Justice Frankfurter], they construe those
principles as requiring a result in this case exactly the opposite from
that reached by the author of the opinion. This being true, it cannot be
assumed that the lower courts. . . will receive better guidance from the
treatise for which this case seems to have provided a vehicle.
Id. at 636 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
128. See generally Robbins & Herman, Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta orfor
Worse, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 629, 656-62 (1976).
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voluntary. 1 29 In these circumstances, although there is in theory
an available alternative, it is so objectionable and undesirable that
in practice a real choice is absent. The Supreme Court early recognized this inferred form of compulsion: "It always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils.
But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not
exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly so
0
called."13
The problem, therefore, is to determine the circumstances in
which a determination is so dilemmatic as to constitute, in effect,
no choice at all. Unfortunately, the judiciary has been unable to
set any clear guidelines. 3 1 As synthesized by Professor Dix:
[Tihe [Supreme] Court has not established a framework for determining the extent to which a state may impose disadvantages
upon a person who declines to waive an important right.
Rather, the vague nature of waiver doctrine has enabled the
Court to shift back and forth between two approaches even in
the context [of] a single area such as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. One, an absolutist approach,
condemns any disadvantage placed upon a defendant who fails
to waive the right. The other, a more flexible approach, balances the degree of infringement upon protected interests
against the gains obtained
by placing the burden upon the exer32
cise of the privilege.1
A good example of the Court's fluctuation is found in the
134
guilty plea cases. 133 The Court held in UnitedStates v. Jackson
that a statute that allowed for capital punishment only in a jury
trial 35 placed too great a burden on the right to trial by jury. Justice Stewart explained that "the evil in the federal statute is not
that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply
that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be in129. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (no waiver when police
officers given choice between self-incrimination and retaining employment; choice
"between the rock and the whirlpool," at 498); Green v. United States, 355 U. S.184
(1957) (no waiver when criminal defendant given choice between appealing conviction and retaining right to be free from double jeopardy); cf.United States v. Dinitz,
424 U.S. 600 (1976) (waiver found when choice was between declaring mistrial and
right to be free from double jeopardy).
130. Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918) (citing The
Eliza Lines, 199 U.S. 119, 130, 131 (1905)).
131. This "fault" lies more with the nature of our legal system than with the judiciary. See generally Robbins, Federalism, State PrisonReform, and Evolving Standards ofHuman Decency On Guessing, Stressing,and Redressing ConstitutionalRights,
26 KAN. L. REy. 551, 566-69 (1978).
132. Dix, supra note 109, at 248-49. The latter approach is addressed at notes
174-240 & accompanying text infra.
133. See generally Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 278-79.
134. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
135. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 760 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a) (1976)).
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herently coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right." 136 Yet

just two years later, in Brady v. United States, 3 7 the Court held
that Jackson did not require the invalidation of every guilty plea

encouraged by fear of the death penalty. The Court commented
that there are many reasons for a defendant pleading guilty and
for the state encouraging defendants to do so, but that these influences do not necessariy rob the defendant of a choice, or compel
1 38

him.

The meaningful choice issue is well illustrated by Fay v.
Noia,139 in which "[h]is [the defendant's] was the grisly choice

whether to sit content with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might well have led
to a retrial and death sentence." 40 But to focus on the grisliness
of the choice is merely to restate the question, for there is little

direction in the opinion on how to distinguish grisly choices from
136. 390 U.S. at 583 (emphasis in original). The Court continued:
Thus the fact that the Federal Kidnapping Act tends to discourage defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial by
jury hardly implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a
charge under the Act does so involuntarily. The power to reject coerced guilty pleas and involuntary jury waivers might alleviate, but it
cannot totally eliminate, the constitutional infirmity in the capital punishment provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also notes 186-89, 264-65 & accompanying text infra.
Without analysis, Justice White, joined by Justice Black, dissented, stating in pertinent part:
The Court itself says that not every plea of guilty or waiver of jury trial
would be influenced by the power of the jury to impose the death penalty. If this is so, I would not hold the provision unconstitutional but
would reverse the judgment, making it clear that pleas of guilty and
waivers of jury trial should be carefully examined before they are accepted, in order to make sure that they have been neither coerced nor
encouraged by the death penalty power in the jury.
390 U.S. at 592 (White, J., dissenting). This statement certainly oversimplifies the
problem and perhaps only restates it. See notes 139-42 & accompanying text infra;
note 163 infra.
137. 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (White, J.) (defendant pleaded guilty after learning that
codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him).
138. See id. at 749-55. "[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State
to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the
State...." Id. at 753. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (not violative of due process for prosecutor to carry out threat made during plea negotiations to
have defendant reindicted on more serious charges and invoke Habitual Criminal
Act, if defendant refused to plead guilty to lesser charges). In Bordenkircher,Justice
Stevens expressed concern at oral argument that a great disparity in punishment for
the two charges might intimidate even an innocent defendant into pleading guilty.
See 22 CRIM. L. REP. 4077 (Nov. 16, 1977). For a critical view of Brady, see Dix,
supra note 109, at 244-46.
139. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
140. Id. at 440.
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strategic waivers. It has been suggested that the possibility of
gain from a bypassing of state procedures should be evidence of a
1 41 However, the grisly
tactical decision not to raise the claim.
choice, too, is characterized by a possibility of benefit; thus the
choice may also be a tactical one.142
The circumstances of the Prisoner Exchange Treaty arguably
can be distinguished from other waiver situations, in that the
Treaty does not involve improper or illegal government coercion,
in part because the American government has no strongly adverse
interest. It may have an indefinite interest in encouraging the re143
turn of prisoners, in order to improve relations with Mexico,'
but this interest probably would not extend to influencing in any
44 The preemiway those prisoners who do not wish to return.
nent objective of the Treaty-to ameliorate the conditions of
45
Americans serving sentences in Mexican prisons' -is the same
interest as the prisoners themselves have. Another reason for the
lack of governmental influence is that strict procedural safeguards
were established for verification of consent.146 Congress has attempted to predetermine, as far as is legislatively and administratively possible, that the prisoner's consent will in actuality be
141. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1965). See generally Lay,
Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D. 45, 60-63
(1969); note 162 infra.
142. See Developments, supra note 46, at 1107-09. "The distinction between a
waiver and a grisly choice, then, rests on the nature of the harm which threatens the
petitioner. . . ." Id. at 1108; see id. at 1108 n.85. See also note 162 infra.
143. See note 2 supra.
144. The absence of forced labor and opportunities for conjugal visits and c6mmercial activities within the Mexican prison system may have persuaded some American prisoners not to seek transfer. A decision not to be transferred also may be
affected by considerations related to eligibility for parole in the United States. See,
e.g., US. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Political and MilitaryAffairs of the House Comm. on International Relations (pt.
III), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1976); note 18 supra; note 168 infra. In addition,
there are such considerations as the problems of being denied a job because of the
American prison record, see, e.g., Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 260, 275,
the inability to purchase better living conditions, see, e.g., id. at 270, 297, and bad
conditions in many American prisons, see note 92 supra. See also House Judiciary
Hearings,supra note 2, at 49-50 (fingerprinting), 219 (conjugal visits). In short, "[i]t
may not be all positive." Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 131 (remarks of
Sen. Biden). See also S. REP. No. 435, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1977). An informal survey indicated that of 75 Mexican nationals jailed in Texas, only 21 desired to
avail themselves of the benefits of the Treaty. See House Judiciary Hearings,supra
note 2, at 219-20. See also id. at 121 (remarks of Mike Abbell) (as many as 20% of
the Americans in Mexican prisons are going to stay). Not surprisingly, the percentage of Canadian nationals who wished to return to Canada was greater. See id. at
220. See also note 22 supra.
145. See note 2 supra. See also 123 CONG. REC. S12,547 (daily ed. July 21, 1977)
(remarks of Sen. Sparkman).
146. Because this is a pre-planned waiver, many of the problems of determining at
a later date whether it was knowing and voluntary are avoided.
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voluntary. 147 The procedure under the Treaty for the verification
of consent, enumerated in section 4108 of the implementing legislation, 148 incorporates those safeguards that the courts have required for the protection against improper waivers in the guilty
plea setting. 49 For example, a magistrate or specially appointed
citizen must officiate at the verification hearing. 5 0 This officer
must advise the prisoner that he has a right to consult with counsel,' 5 ' that an opportunity to consult with counsel will be allowed
before the proceeding continues, 52 and that counsel will be pro153
vided if the prisoner financially is unable to obtain it.
The officer also must verify that the offender understands and agrees to
the conditions of the transfer, including, inter alia, that only Mexico can modify or set aside the conviction, that if the United States
determines that the transfer violates the treaties or laws of the
United States, the prisoner may be returned to Mexico, and that
consent once given is irrevocable. 54 Further, the officer must determine that the prisoner's consent is voluntary, and "not the result of any promises, threats, or other improper inducements."' 5 5
Finally, the consent must be noted on an appropriate form, and
the entire proceedings must be recorded. 56
These procedures afford all the ingredients that courts have
found lacking in other waiver situations: that the determination of
a waiver must be made personally by a judge, 57 that the waiver
may be made with advice of counsel, 158 that there must be an affirmative showing that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, 5 9
and that the record must reflect that a knowing and voluntary
147. See Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 2, 25-26, 138; 123 CONG. REC.
S12,551 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits), S 12,553 (daily ed. July 21,
1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 123 CONG. REC. HI 1,461 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Brown). Nevertheless, the transfer possibility still was labelled a potential "Draconian" or "Hobson's choice." See Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note
3, at 235.
148. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108 (West Supp. 1978).
149. See also notes 249-63 & accompanying text infra.
150. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(a) (West Supp. 1978).
151. Id. § 4108(c). See note 162 infra.
152. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(c) (West Supp. 1978).
153. Id. § 4109.
154. Id. § 4108(b); see note 125 supra.
155. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(d) (West Supp. 1978).
156. Id. § 4108(d), (e).
157. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969); McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-67 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465
(1938); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
158. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). The requirement of counsel itself
can be waived. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
159. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
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waiver was made.' 60 Therefore, with these procedures put into
practice, there should be little problem in deciding whether a
waiver occurred. 16 ' Nevertheless, the fact that there are formal
procedural safeguards does not completely resolve the underlying
62
issue: whether there is an effective choice to be made.
Senator Robert Griffin addressed this point before Congress:
[The prisoner's] alternatives are incarceration in this country or
continued confinement in Mexico. The alternative of remaining in Mexico is so unattractive to most prisoners that in reality
these individuals are left with but one choice-incarceration in
this country. To deprive an individual of his right to challenge
his Mexican conviction under such63circumstances conflicts with
fundamental notions of fairness.1
On the other hand, if the prisoners refuse to return to the United
States because they do not wish to forego their rights, they must
remain in the foreign prison wholly bereft of any American rights
upon which to insist. Thus, perhaps the offer of benefits on the
condition that the prisoners relinquish their rights cannot be said
to have induced or coerced that relinquishment, because they had
160. See, e.g., Carniley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). See also note 250 & accompanying text infra.
161. For a valid noncriminal waiver situation, see Jolley v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1971) (waiver of
right to citizenship under pressure of threat of being drafted). It is arguable that
there is less of a need for procedural safeguards in the Treaty, because the transfer
situation is not one that is so inherently intimidating or coercive as, e.g., police interrogation or plea bargaining, where the government has a strongly adverse interest.
See notes 143-45 & accompanying text supra.
162. Even if counsel is present, there is some question regarding the nature of
counsel's decisions. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963) with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See generally Spritzer, note 109 supra; Developments, supra note 46, at 1106, 1109-12. The issue of government-paid attorneys also
raised some concern about conflict of interest, see, e.g., Senate Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 3, at 63, 137-38, 288-90; House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 136 n.8,
163, as did the "possible problem in having counsel advising American citizens who
are not fully aware of or versed in Mexican law as to whether or not that would
impact on the question of consent," Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 288
(question by Sen. Biden). Professor Arthur Miller also objected to providing government-paid attorneys, but on the ground that the United States should not be "a welfare state for lawyers." House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 250 (statement of
Arthur S. Miller).
163. 123 CONG. REC. S12,549 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) (individual views of Sen.
Griffin). He continued:
Some commentators contend that this deficiency may be overcome
by surrounding the consent or waiver process with various procedural
safeguards . . . . It is difficult to perceive, however, how the implementation of these procedures will render the consent or waiver voluntary. Infact, such discussion obscures the crucialissue. Ifthe consent or
waiver is deemed inherently involuntary, then it is invalid no matter what
procedures are employed.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra
note 3, at 62, 126, 235; House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 123 ("meaty, interesting, and complicated question") (remarks of Rep. Eilberg), 125.
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no American rights to relinquish in the first place. 164 In the
words of one legal commentator, "[a]ll that the prisoners have
done is to surrender the right to serve a sentence in a Mexican
prison in favor of the option to serve the sentence in an American
prison."1 6 5 In addition, it has been argued that not only does the
Treaty not deprive the prisoners of any rights, but also it confers
rights that the prisoners theretofore did not have.166 By returning
to the United States, the prisoners can utilize various benefits of
our legal system, such as challenging local conditions of confinement167 and attempting to secure release on parole. 168 This view
is supported by North Carolinav. A/ford,169 wherein the defendant knowingly and voluntarily desired to plead guilty, while still
maintaining his innocence. The Supreme Court declared: "The
prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas should not
be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic render

those constitutional guarantees counterproductive and put in jeopardy the very human values they were meant to preserve."' 170 Yet

164. See Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 3, at 127; Senate Judiciary
Hearings,supra note 3, at 125, 215; House Judiciary Hearings,supra note 2, at 120,
125.
165. Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 215 (memorandum of Detlev F.
Vagts). Professor Vagts continued: "By so doing, they indicate that the American
prison is, from their point of view, preferable." Id.
166. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. S12,551 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) (statement of Sen.
Sparkman): "This Treaty does not take away a right presently held by an American in
a Mexican prison, but it does allow them the greater protection of our laws and an
improved chance successfully to re-enter society."
167. See generallyRobbins & Buser, note 92 supra. See also Treaty, supra note 1,
at art. V, para. 2.
168. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 2. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 4112 (West
Supp. 1978); notes 18, 144 supra. Quite significant concern was expressed before
Congress, for the eligibility of all transferred prisoners, see Senate JudiciaryHearings,
supra note 3, at 26, 62-64, raising the possibility that American authorities could, in
effect, be "rewriting the Mexican sentences." Id. at 64. For the record, Senator
Mathias made it clear that "the President of Mexico not long ago said that they want
to get rid of all of the American prisoners and they don't care what happens after they
get out of Mexico." Id. at 126-27. Later testimony indicated that the transferred
prisoners would be treated for purposes of parole like their American counterparts
who had been convicted of analogous offenses, see House Judiciary Hearings,supra
note 2, at 117-20, so that the transferred prisoner would not "have an unfair advantage over one who has been sentenced here .... ." Id. at 117-18 (remarks of Rep.
Eilberg). This position was confirmed by the Acting Chairman of the United States
Parole Commission. See id. at 149-50 (letter of Curtis C. Crawford).
There also was some worry that the returning Americans might be treated as
"folk heroes." See Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 260-61.
169. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
170. Id. at 39. Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that Alford had been "so
gripped by fear of the death penalty," id. at 40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970)), that his decision to plead guilty had
not been voluntary but rather was "the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint." 400 U.S. at 40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 606 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
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this argument can cut both ways: the fact that the prisoners themselves clamored for the opportunity to return to the United
States 7' may be a good indication of the absence of an effective

choice.
In conclusion, the question of waiver is not a precise one. In
order to delimit the fine distinctions between voluntariness and
72 and further determicoercion, more lines will have to be drawn
173
nations will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.
3.

The Transfer as an Unconstitutional Condition on the Right

to Habeas Corpus
Viewed from a different perspective, the waiver question may
be part of the larger issue of placing a potentially unconstitutional
condition on a right. 174 The doctrine of unconstitutional condi-

tions, which has vitality apart from the criminal context, applies to

benefits granted by the state that are contingent upon the aban1 75 The major
donment or relinquishment of a particular right.

objection to such conditions is that they may place too great a
burden on the assertion of those rights. Recognizing that an indirect encumbrance might be so similar in its suppressive effect to a

I have to say at this point that I am perhaps more than ever-I hope
as much now-I have a real appreciation for the rights granted under
our Constitution and the Bill of Rights. These rights I have previously
taken for granted. I would like to stress that there are other United
States prisoners in Mexico that have learned the hard way. But at least
they have learned that the rights granted under the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights are precious. I am sure in my correspondence with them
and my communications that they do appreciate these rights much
more. By far the majority of them would be ever so thankful to be able
to return to the United States as prisoners. They understand that.
Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 259 (statement of Dwight Worker, former
prisoner, who had escaped by dressing as a woman and walking past five checkpoints). Cf. note 213 infra (discussing desires of some prisoners to be transferred to
another forum in order to challenge their convictions). See also id. at 253, 258-59,
275-76; House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 251.
172. "Where the line is to be drawn between the important and the trivial cannot
be settled by a formula." Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243, 129 N.E.
889, 891 (1921) (Cardozo, J.). See also note 102 supra.
173. This conclusion should not be surprising, particularly in light of recent
habeas corpus decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) ("We leave open for resolution in future decisions the
precise definition of the 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard . . ."). See also Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 517-18 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595
(1960); Comment, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
144 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Another Look].
175. The unconstitutional condition doctrine does not turn on a distinction between a state benefit that is characterized as a "right" and one that is merely a "privilege." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See generally Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968).
171.
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direct prohibition of rights that both may be violative of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has stated that "[iun reality, the [individual] is given no choice, except the choice between the rock and
the whirlpool-an option to forego a privilege which may be vital
. . .or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolera176
ble burden."
Initially, courts had reasoned that if a state had the power to
withhold a benefit completely, it also had the power to withhold it
partially. 77 In 1926, for example, although acknowledging the
state's authority to condition benefits, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and
one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If
the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right
as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded
in the Constitution of the
78 United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.1
Generally, however, the Court has held that the doctrine does not
demand the invalidation of every benefit that is conditioned on
the foregoing of a constitutional right.' 79 Rather, a balancing
approach has been utilized, weighing the importance of the
state's interest against the degree of infringement. 180 In adjudging the former, the following requirements must be met: the interest must be a legitimate one,' 8 ' and the restriction must be
precisely drawn 8 2 and necessary to accomplish the state's objec176. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).
177. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 175, at 1495; Another Look, supra note
174, at 145.
178. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94
(1926). Of course, the question still remains whether habeas corpus is "embedded in
the Constitution." See generally notes 49-87 & accompanying text supra; notes 19699 & accompanying text infra.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968). See also
Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967); note 137 supra.
180. See generallyAnother Look, supra note 174, at 163; note 132 & accompanying
text supra. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 175, at 1448.
181. An example of an illegitimate interest is an intent to suppress the particular
constitutional right. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968);
Another Look, supra note 174, at 154-55.
182. Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1235 (D.D.C. 1974). Conditional presidential pardon cases, like Hoffa, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Birzon v.
King, 469 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1972), have been analogized to the Treaty in discussions
of its constitutionality, because in both situations the prisoner is offered a bargain by
which he can only improve his lot. See, e.g., Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3,
at 125 (statement of Barbara M. Watson):
[Rleasonable conditions may be attached when a benefit is conferred
upon a prisoner. The person accepting the pardon must take the whole
package offered to him. Similarly, where the President and the Congress have together obtained a special and unusual benefit for an offender, he should not be able to repudiate his assent to the conditions
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tive. 183 In considering the degree of infringement, three factors4
are evaluated: the importance of the benefit being conferred,"

of the right, and how directly the right is inthe importance
85

fringed.
This approach has been applied in a variety of cases. In
86
United States v. Jackson, for example, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal kidnapping statute that provided for the impo-

sition of the death penalty only upon a jury verdict. The Court

confirmed the valid governmental objective of mitigating the se87
verity of the death penalty; nevertheless, it opined that this objective could be achieved in a manner less burdensome on the

right to trial by jury and, therefore, unnecessarily promoted guilty
pleas.188
89
Verner,
A similar result was achieved in Sherbert v.
discouragin
interest
wherein a conflict arose between the state's

ing fraudulent unemployment compensation claims and the individual's right to religious freedom. The Court held that by
obligating the party to select between receiving the unemployment

benefits and requiring her to work on Saturday, her day of wor-

ship, the state was burdening her first amendment religious right.
The rule was declared invalid, because the state proved neither a
compelling state interest nor that it had used the least restrictive
which were necessary to achieve that benefit. Success in such repudiation would . . . destroy this avenue of relief for all later cases.
Cf Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 3, at 96 (statement of Alan C.
Swan):
I don't find those cases terribly persuasive in this context. I would find
it difficult, for example, to think of the President giving a pardon on
condition that the recipient of that pardon forgo the right by habeas
corpus to challenge the validity of the.underlying conviction. I would
suggest that his acceptance of the pardon might not even warrant upholding that condition.
Professor Swan's argument may be a bit overstated, for it is clear that the Treaty
could not have been negotiated successfully absent the waiver provision. See note
212 infra. See also note 183 infra. In Hoffa, the court formulated a three-pronged
standard for determining the constitutionality of conditional pardons: (1)the pardon
must have been voluntarily accepted by its beneficiary, 378 F. Supp. at 1242 (citing
Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 315 (1856)); (2) the condition must "be directly related to the public interest," 378 F. Supp. at 1236; and (3) the condition must
not be more restrictive of constitutional freedoms than is reasonably necessary. Id.
183. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968). Cf.Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 410-12 (1974) (prisoners' first amendment rights) (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
184. That is, the less important the benefit, the less coercive pressure is necessary
to relinquish the right. See Another Look, supra note 174, at 154.
185. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99, 100-01 (1947).
186. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See notes 134-38 & accompanying text supra. See also
notes 264-65 & accompanying text infra.
187. 390 U.S. at 582-83.
188. Id. at 581-82.
189. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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0
means to achieve that interest. 19

In contrast, the Court upheld the validity of a restriction on
first amendment rights in United Public Workers v. Mitchell.19 1
At issue was a provision of the Hatch Act, 192 which subjected to
dismissal federal employees who were actively engaged in politics.
The Supreme Court held that the restriction was rationally related
to the legitimate governmental objective of promoting the effi-

ciency and integrity of federal employees. 193 The Court concluded that the degree of infringement was minimal and that the
balance should be struck in favor of the government,

94

because

the workers still could vote and engage in limited partisan activity. 195
This weighing approach also was utilized in Smartt v.
96

a Sixth Circuit case that involved the right to habeas
corpus. The court of appeals invalidated a state parole board regAvery,

ulation that assessed an additional year of incarceration prior to
consideration for parole for prisoners who had unsuccessfully
filed habeas corpus petitions. 197 The court noted the great chil-

ling effect on the right to petition for habeas relief, 98 observing
that "[olnly a prisoner with an inclination to play Russian roulette
with a year of his life would be likely to file a petition for habeas
corpus under this regulation."'' 99

These unconstitutional conditions issues are similar to those
confronted by the voluntary waiver analysis. The heavier the
burden placed on the assertion of a constitutional right, due to the
resulting loss of a benefit, the less voluntary is the waiver of that
190. Id. at 406-09.
191. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
192. Hatch Act, ch. 410, §§ 2, 8, 53 Stat. 1147-48 (1939) (current version at 5
U.S.C. §§ 7324-7325 (1976) (original version at 18 U.S.C. § 61(h) (Supp. V. 1937)).
193. 330 U.S. at 102.
194. Id. at 94-104.
195. Id. at 99-102.
196. 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
197. See id. at 789.
198.
The right of a state prisoner to petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the federal courts on a claim that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is squarely authorized by federal law . . . . The exercise of this right may not be denied by state
law . .

.

. No more may its exercise be discouraged by the withhold-

ing of a privilege (which would otherwise be accorded) by state law or
regulation.
Id. at 790 (citations omitted). Cf.Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (requiring
prison officials to assist inmates in the preparation of legal papers); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974) (denying the right of counsel for discretionary appeals); Younger
v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam) (relying on Johnson v. Avery); Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (invalidating regulation barring prisoners from assisting
inmates in preparation of legal documents).
199. 370 F.2d at 790.
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2
right; that is, no meaningful choice is presented. 00 The two in20 1
The voluntary
quiries differ, however, in their emphasis.
waiver inquiry focuses on the individual-i e., did this person voluntarily waive the right?-while the unconstitutional conditions
analysis addresses the statute or regulation-ie., does the provision on its face too heavily burden the assertion of a constitutional
right? The Supreme Court in Jackson was cognizant of this difference, stating that it was unnecessary to decide whether the
guilty plea was voluntary, because the evil was in the statute itself.20 2 Therefore, even if the waiver of habeas corpus pursuant
to the Prisoner Exchange Treaty were determined to be voluntary,
it still would be necessary to inquire whether article VI imposes an

unconstitutional condition.

20

3

Through the Mexican-American Prisoner Exchange Treaty,
the government is extending a benefit-imprisonment in this
country--conditioned upon the relinquishment of the right to petition for habeas corpus relief. Without more, this might appear
to be a classic example of an unconstitutional condition. A solicitous application of the balancing standard, however, produces
some support for the Treaty's validation.
The initial consideration is the legitimacy and importance of

the governmental objective. 2°4 The policies advanced by Con-

gress for endorsing the Treaty were twofold: to ease diplomatic
relations with Mexico on the sensitive issue of the abuse of the
20 and to alleviate special
American citizens confined in Mexico,
200. See generally Another Look, supra note 174, at 159-60; notes 129-42 & accompanying text supra.
201. See note 127 & accompanying text supra.
202. 390 U.S. at 583. See also note 136 & accompanying text supra. The Court
has not consistently recognized this distinction, however. For example, in Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the majority employed the voluntariness analysis,
but three dissenting Justices argued that the real question was whether the choice
between retaining public employment and self-incrimination imposed an unconstitutional condition. Id. at 506-07 (Harlan, Clark & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
203. Probably the more difficult question is to determine--even if the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not violated-whether the waiver was voluntary. See
generally notes 241-78 & accompanying text infra. To Justice Black, habeas corpus
was immune from a balancing process. See Black, The Bill ofRights and the Federal
Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 41, 57 (E. Cahn ed. 1963).

204. See note 181 supra.
205. See note 2 supra. The alleged violations of Mexican law and international
convention agreement include: torture and physical abuse at the time of arrest, including the use of an electric cattle prod and water tortures; extortion by unscrupulous attorneys and prison officials; coerced confessions made in Spanish, at gunpoint,
and without the aid of an interpreter; denial of access to legal counsel and to embassy
representatives, despite repeated requests; incommunicado detention, sometimes for
weeks; confiscation of personal property, such as cameras, automobiles, passports,
and jewelry; extensive pretrial detention in flagrant violation of the Mexican law that
requires sentencing within one year of arrest; absence of interpreters during court
proceedings; and general prison abuse, including lack of proper health facilities, un-
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hardships resulting from imprisonment in a foreign country. 20 6
Both of these concerns lie within the extensive foreign powers held
by the President and Congress 20 7 and arguably are a valid and
laudable exercise of those powers. Easing diplomatic relations
with a foreign nation clearly is important, particularly when that
nation borders on our own;208 nor can one doubt the significance
alleviating conditions of
to the prisoners and their families209 of
210
American citizens confined in Mexico.
The second point to consider is whether the burden on the
habeas corpus right is necessary to further the governmental
objectives. 21' In this regard, few circumstances could be more
certain than those relating to this Treaty. According to Congress,
without the condition of waiver of habeas corpus, the Treaty
could not have been negotiated. 212 Absent a provision prohibiting collateral attack on the Mexican conviction in a court of the
United States, conceivably many actions would have been instisanitary health conditions, prison brutality, rape, and lack of basic resources for even
a minimal standard of living. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note
3, at 3, 7-8, 20-27, 172-260, 271-75; Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 3, at 129,

255-76; House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 2, at 151-56, 250-51. See also U.S Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Political
and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 50-53 (1975-1976). See also 4 CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE 3-16 (June 1978);
TIME, Dec. 19, 1977, at 25; Kansas City Star, Dec. 18, 1977, at IOB, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
March 13, 1976, at 28, col. 4; id. May 9, 1976, at 9, col. 1; note 225 infra.
206. See note 3 supra.
207. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383
(1959); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). See generally L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 172-203 (1978).
208. See, e.g., House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 2, at 151.
209. See generally sources cited in note 205 supra.
210. Moreover, the alleviation of these conditions is consistent with President
Carter's current stand on human rights. See, e.g., President Carter's News Conference
of Feb. 23, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 251 (1977); Human Rights:An Important Concern of
U.S Foreign Policy, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 289 (1977) (statement of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State); Carter, The President's Commencement Address at
the University of Notre Dame, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 9 (1977); Comment, The International Human Rights Treaties. Some Problems of Policy and Interpretation, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 886 (1978). See also Mondale, Human Rights in America, 23 CATH. LAW.
25 (1977).
211. See notes 182-83 supra.
212. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 3, at 94, 96.
[I]n that posture, the legal issue subtly changes. The question is no
longer, can the U.S. Government, in granting a benefit, impose limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights. The question becomes,
can the U.S. Government agree or acquiesce in the foreign government's demand that these rights be relinquished when that is the price
the foreign government demands for its cooperation in assisting Americans abroad.
Id. at 96 (statement of Alan C. Swan).

2, at 136.

See also House Judiciary Hearings, supra note
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tuted, 213 putting our courts in the uneasy posture of having to determine whether Mexican courts had observed Mexican law and
constitutional provisions. 2 14 Not only could this prove to be politically embarrassing to Mexico with respect to the very issue of
human rights violations that the Treaty was designed to amelio-

rate, 215- but it also could affect the Mexican attitude in cases in2 16 Further, Americans in
volving American citizens in the future.

Mexico would be little deterred in committing crimes if it were
21 7
likely that an American court would not uphold the conviction.

The third inquiry concerns the importance of the benefit being conferred. 21 8 In non-criminal cases, this is usually related to
employment or the means of obtaining a livelihood or a substitute
therefor, such as unemployment benefits. 21 9 In criminal cases,

the importance typically depends on the potential role of the bene-

fit in freeing a defendant or lessening the duration of his confinement. 220 In Smartt v. Avery, 22 ' for example, a habeas corpus case,
213. "[T]he feeling that most of these prisoners had, at least in the back of their
mind [sic], was the idea of challenging their sentences the minute they got into a
forum in which they could challenge them. That was in fact one of the motivations
for desiring the ratification of the treaty. This gave them a chance to look for an
escape valve." Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 3, at 130 (statement of Sen.
Mathias). See note 171 & accompanying text supra.
214. See notes 35, 41 & accompanying text supra.
215. See note 205 supra.
216. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3, at 131, 132. "If
[the prisoners] are successful, notwithstanding the consent provisions of the treaty,
then we run the risk. . . that the Mexican government will feel that this is a breach of
faith and this could have unhappy portents for the future." Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 3, at 130 (statement of Sen. Mathias). See also id. at 66, 68, 127-28,
306. Senator Biden remarked:
The first person out who gets here in America and has a writ of habeas
corpus and challenges the proceeding in Mexico, and if the Supreme
Court of the United States finds that their justice system does not meet
the minimal standards then that is all over. No one else will get out.
Id. at 274-75. See generally Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse."Recprocal
Claimsand Tolerancesin Interstateand InternationalLaw, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956);
Scharpf, JudicialReview and the PoliticalQuestion."A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517 (1966); Note, JudicialDeference to the State Departmenton InternationalLegal Issues, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (1948). "For their part, the courts are not equipped
or competent to make foreign policy, or to judge the impact of their rulings in occasional cases on the vital concerns of the nation." Henkin, The ForeignAffairs Powers
of the Federal Courts.- Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 832 (1965). See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-32 (1964); Irizarry y Puente,
The Concept of "Denialof Justice" in Latin America, 43 MICH. L. REV. 383, 390-91
(1944) ("the final judgments of the courts of justice of a country are entitled to respect
as self-evident legal truths"); note 168 supra.
217. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 3, at 129; Constitutional Problems, supra note 82, at 1521.
218. See note 184 supra.
219. See, e.g., notes 184-90 & accompanying text supra.
220. See, e.g., notes 196-99 & accompanying text supra. See generally Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
221. 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
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the court viewed early eligibility for parole as an advantage of
vital consequence.2 22 Similarly, because a transferred prisoner is
eligible for parole in the United States, 223 while no provisions for
parole are available in Mexico, a very substantial return is obtained. Other possible benefits include better living conditions, at
the least in terms of the rudimentary implements for comfort and
personal hygiene, 224 being
nearer to one's family and friends, and
225
being in one's culture.
Next, the importance of the constitutional right 226 must be
evaluated. The real problem presented by this factor is not so
much the value and importance of habeas corpus, but rather
whether it qualifies as a constitutional right. Although it is not an
explicit constitutional right, such as those listed in the Bill of
Rights, the Constitution does specifically mention habeas corpus
and prohibit its suspension. 227 But it is unclear whether the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions requires the particular right to
be one of direct constitutional dimension. 228 In United Public
Workers v. Mitchell,229 for example, the action restricted was the
222. Id. at 790; see note 198 supra.
223. See note 168 supra.
224. The conditions at certain prisons in Mexico, such as those at Hermosillo and
Oriente, are markedly better than the conditions at other prisons, such as those at
Guadalajara, Lecumberri, Mazatlan, and Santa Marta. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3, at 10, 12-13, 15, 228-29; Senate Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 3, at 129, 131, 262-72. "Mazatlan is called the Mississippi of Mexico."
Id. at 272 (remarks of Lynell F. Marshall, mother of a prisoner); see House Judiciary
Hearings,supra note 2, at 123; TIME, Dec. 19, 1977, at 25. Certainly conditions also
vary among American prisons. See generally Robbins & Buser, supra note 92. See
also 64 A.B.A.J. 822 (1978) (col. 4); note 205 supra.
225. Geographically, one may be closer to his family while remaining incarcerated
in Mexico. But in a more metaphysical sense, confinement in Mexico is worlds away
from confinement in the United States. As a former Mexican prisoner stated:
[Y]ou are operating in a different system and a different culture. The
differences between the wealth of Americans and . . . [that of the]

Mexicans, is just too great to be ignored in prison. The temptations for
extortion are too overwhelming to resist. [Prison transfer] is the sensible way to reduce a lot of this because upon the prisoner transfer treaty,
a lot of the extortion and the hardship, extraneous to the actual conviction itself, could be reduced. But until it is it must be remembered that
U.S. prisoners overseas are big business. That is the key word. Guilt
or innocence has nothing to do with it, once in prison. Bail or a bond
or anything like it is precluded. But it is big business. It's a moneymaking proposition for people involved.
Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 257-58 (remarks of Dwight Worker). See
also note 3 supra.
226. See note 185 & accompanying text supra.
227. See notes 49-82 & accompanying text supra.
228. Professor Van Alstyne refers to "a right protected by an explicit provision in
the Constitution," Van Alstyne, supra note 175, at 1447, but this does not clarify the
issue for present purposes. See notes 49-65 & accompanying text supra.
229. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

1978]

PRISONER EXCHANGE TREATY

organization of political activities; 230 yet the court in Smartt v.
Avery 23 1 clearly applied the same doctrine to habeas corpus, con-

232 In any event, it certainly
firming it to be a constitutional right.
is arguable that not only is habeas corpus being restricted, but so
too is the fifth amendment due process right, for the transferred
prisoners would be deprived of their liberty by the United States
without a United States trial. 233 Moreover, there is support for
habeas corpus being considered as an element of the first amend"to petition the Government for a redress of grievment right
234
ances."
The final factor to consider is how directly the right is infringed. 235 At first glance, the transfer may appear to be an obvious case of unadulterated infringement, because the prisoners are
236
categorically denied collateral relief in United States courts.
But further thought may indicate that at this point in the analysis
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions fails for the transferred
prisoners. The American prisoner in Mexico is in a decidedly different position from the American prisoner in the United States.
Unlike the latter, the former does not have any right to collaterally attack in this country the judgment of conviction, for the only
237
contact with the United States is the citizenship of the prisoner.
If an American prisoner convicted in an American court were offered a benefit conditioned on the relinquishment of habeas
corpus, he would have to surrender a vested right to bring a
habeas action. 238 The prisoner in Mexico, however, has no
habeas right to relinquish. 239 Arguably, he only agrees not to acquire the right to habeas corpus by accepting American imprisonment. In addition, by not receiving the benefit of confinement in
the United States, the prisoner is neither gaining nor retaining the
habeas corpus right. So, in one sense, the choice presented is to
acquire the benefit and not the right, on the one hand, and to
acquire neither the benefit nor the right, on the other hand.
230. See notes 191-95 & accompanying text supra.

231. 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
232. See notes 196-99 & accompanying text supra.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall ...

property, without due process of law .

be deprived of life, liberty, and

See notes 28-44 & accompanying text

supra.

234. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Johnson

v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). See also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S.
576 (1971).
235. See note 185 & accompanying text supra.
236. See notes 17, 97 supra.
237. See note 164 & accompanying text supra.
238. See general,y United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); notes 49-82, 196-99 & accompanying text supra.
239. See notes 164-65 & accompanying text supra.
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Therefore, perhaps on balance it cannot be said that the condition
either discourages or impermissibly burdens a constitutional right,
because the relation of the prisoner to the right does not change
whether or not the benefit is accepted. In another sense, however,
this all may be part of one of the original questions, to wit:
whether the United States becomes inextricably involved with the
convicted ofMexican criminal justice system by imprisoning the
240
fender, thereby completing the criminal process.
CONCLUSION

If one point is clear from the foregoing analysis, it is that the
question of the constitutionality of article VI of the MexicanAmerican Prisoner Exchange Treaty is a close one, particularly on
the issues of waiver and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 24 ' It may well be that the Treaty, if litigated, 242 will be held
to be violative of the Constitution. 243 Certainly stranger things
have occurred in the life of the law. 2 " But such an outcome is
unlikely, especially in view of current legal developments. Recent cases of the United States Supreme Court have severely restricted the scope and operation of habeas corpus for American
prisoners, 24 5 and generally the judicial climate is waxing in favor
of a greater degree of finality of criminal convictions. 24 6 In the
area of guilty pleas as well, the examination of which is crucial to
deciding the issue of waiver of rights, 247 present trends lend support to the constitutionality of the Treaty.
The Court recently had occasion to observe that "[w]hatever
might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty
plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly ad240. See notes 28-44 & accompanying text supra.
241. While the expert congressional witnesses testified on the many intertwined
issues that the Treaty and implementing legislation would be upheld by the courts,
perhaps Professor Abernathy was the most realistic: "What I would like to convince
the subcommittee of is that no matter how many people you get here to testify, you
cannot be assured of either result. . . . [But] there are quite a few ways the [legislation] could be tightened up to induce the court psychologically to approve the waiver
... " House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 225. Senator Mathias' attitude
and perspective also were insightful. See generally Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra
note 3, at 129-32.
242. To date, the Treaty has not been challenged in the courts.
243. See notes 19, 24, 168 supra.
244. "[The Constitution is] a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary,
which they may twist and shape into any form they please." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), reprinted in L. GOLDBERG & E.
LEVENSON, LAWLESS JUDGES 11 (1935) (footnote omitted).
245. See note 64 supra.
246. Id See generally Robbins & Sanders, supra note 38, at 84 n.175.
247. See notes 134-38, 169-70 & accompanying text supra.
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ministered, they can benefit all concerned. ' 248 The open
acknowledgment of this previously clandestine practice has led
the Court to recognize the importance of counsel during plea negotiations, 249 the need for a public record indicating that the plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made, 25 0 and the requirement that
25
a prosecutor's plea-bargaining promise be kept. ' On more sub-'
stantive grounds, the Court has held that due process "requires
that vindictiveness against the defendant for having successfully
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial. ' 252 The same principle latterly was applied to prohibit a prosecutor from reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after the defendant had invoked an
appellate remedy, since in this situation there was also a "realistic
likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' "253
In these cases, the Court was dealing with the state's unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen to
exercise a legal right to attack his original conviction-a situation
"very different from the give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining between the prosecution and the defense, which
'25 4
The
arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.
the
in
not
lay
violation
process
due
the
that
Court has emphasized
of
exercise
the
from
deterred
be
might
possibility that a defendant
255
state
the
that
danger
the
in
rather
but
a constitutional right,
might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his
conviction.2 56 To punish a person because he has done what the
law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most
basic sort, 257 and for an agent of the government to pursue a
course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance
248. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
249. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970); see notes 151-53,

158 & accompanying text supra.
250. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see notes 156, 160 &

accompanying text supra.
251. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). See also note
157 & accompanying text supra.
252. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969); see AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.1 (1968); Note, Plea Bargainingandthe Transformation of the CriminalProcess,90 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1977). See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970).
253. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
254. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, Douglas &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting). This equality of bargaining positions arguably is not free
from doubt.
255. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407

U.S. 104 (1972).
256. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 26-38 (1974). This certainly is not the
case with the Prisoner Exchange Treaty. See note 212 supra.

257. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969).
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on his legal rights is "patently unconstitutional., 258 But in the
give-and-take of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long259as the accused is free to accept or
reject the government's offer.
There has been no assertion that the purpose of the Treaty's
prohibition against collateral attack in the United States is to punish or retaliate against the transferred prisoner. Rather, like the
situation of the bargaining defendant, the prisoner exchange may
flow from the "mutuality of advantage" to the individual and the
260
government, each with its own reasons for wanting the transfer,
with intrinsic procedural protections theoretically to assure an
arms-length bargain. 261 Although confronting the defendant with
a particular choice may have a "'discouraging effect on the...
assertion of his.

. .

rights, the imposition of these difficult choices

[is] an inevitable'-and permissible--'attribute of any legal system
which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.' "262
Perhaps the same holds true for prisoner exchanges. 263 Discussing United States v. Jackson,264 the Supreme Court has made it
clear that "subsequent cases have not diluted its force: if the only
objective of a [governmental] practice is to discourage the assertion of constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' "265
266
But the Prisoner Exchange Treaty clearly has other purposes,
258. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968); see Chaffm v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 n.20 (1973).
259. Thus, for example, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (5 to 4
decision), the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment was not violated when a state prosecutor carried out a threat made during plea negotiations to have the accused reindicted on more serious charges, on
which he was plainly subject to prosecution, if he did not plead guilty to the offense
with which he originally was charged.
260. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
261. See notes 147-56 & accompanying text supra; note 241 supra.
262. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (quoting Chaflin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)). It may follow that-by tolerating and encouraging the
negotiation of pleas-the Supreme Court necessarily has accepted as constitutionally
legitimate the fact that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade
the defendant to forego his right to plead not guilty.
263. Such exchanges may be as essential to international harmony, at least in certain circumstances, as is the plea bargaining process to the functioning of the criminal
justice system. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); note 2 & accompanying text supra. See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3, at 129.
264. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See notes 134-36, 186-88 & accompanying text supra.
265. See note 258 supra. Perhaps the Supreme Court will have more to say about
the issues posed in Jackson. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 74 N.J. 379, 378 A.2d 235
(1977), probable jurisdiction noted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978) (No. 775903) (fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments are not violated by a procedure that
imposes a mandatory life sentence upon a jury conviction but allows a lesser sentence
upon defendants who plead guilty). Corbitt is set for oral argument the first week in
October 1978. 46 U.S.L.W. 3165 (Sept. 26, 1978).
266. See note 3 & accompanying text supra.
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perhaps the most important of which is to improve the living con-

ditions for confined American citizens. In fact, if the Court is
doing anything positive for American prisoners, it is in the area of

267
reforming conditions of confinement, rather than that of reduc-

268 Thus even casing or eliminating the duration of confinement.
ual observers of American law of prisoners' rights and remedies

would agree that the Treaty conforms well to the contemporary

pattern.
Of course, although article VI of the Treaty may be constitutional, it may nevertheless be unwise in its effect on the writ of
habeas corpus. 269 But to have terminated all negotiations solely
because of a failure to include such a provision might have been at
267. "Our Constitution must be evident even in the darkness of our prisons because that is the kind of society that we are and because this is the standard that we
set for ourselves." Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 121 (statement of Sen.
Bentsen). See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978) (limitation on sentences to
isolation); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (access to the courts); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (medical treatment); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)
(disciplinary proceedings); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (disciplinary
proceedings); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 394 (1974) (first amendment rights).
But see, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978) (media visitation); Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (unionization);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (transfers); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976) (transfers); cf. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976) (timing of parole
revocation hearing); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976) (exhaustion of state administrative remedies). See generally Robbins & Buser, note 92 supra; Comment,
Confronting the Conditions of Confinement. An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison
Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 368 (1977).
268. See generally Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Note, State Prisoners'
Suits Brought on Issues Dispositive of Confinement- The Aftermath of Preiser v.
Rodriguez and Wolff v. McDonnell, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 742 (1977).
Even if the clauses foreclosing collateral attack are ultimately up269.
held, the continued imprisonment of some, perhaps many, of the prisoners will remain predicated upon suspected violations of their
fundamental rights, a suspicion they have not had an opportunity to test
in an American court of law. Yet, if these clauses are upheld, the Executive's otherwise commendable desire to insulate the problem of Americans who get into legal troubles abroad from the larger concerns of our
diplomacy, will be a strong incentive to negotiate comparable arrangements with other countries. It is this possibility which causes me some
concern.
I worry about the prospect, over time, of increasing numbers of
Americans being held in American prisons under these doubtful circumstances without having had their "day in court." Liberal grants of
parole will alleviate, but not eliminate, the problem.
Such a situation will not, I suggest, enhance our record on human
rights. In time, the bitterness of the prisoners, the travesty of justice
that their imprisonment represents and the suspicion that they remain
in prison only because the American government does not wish to offend a foreign power, may come to dominate our own and the world's
perception of this otherwise humane enterprise.
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3, at 128-29 (statement of Alan C.
Swan). See also note 64 supra; notes 271-72 & accompanying text infra.
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least as ill-advised. 270
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The Mexican-American Prisoner Ex-

change Treaty is an experiment for this country 27 1 and may pave
the way to other treaties of a similar nature, 272 with similar bene-

270. See notes 212, 213 & accompanying text supra.
271. See notes 25, 37, 269 supra.
I find myself between a rock and a hardplace. I have serious reservations about the effectiveness of this treaty in solving the deplorable conditions and absence of legal and human rights for Americans who are
arrested in Mexico and are outside the treaty's jurisdiction. On the
other hand, I must urge and support its ratification, if for no other reason than that even in its small way, the treaty is a step towards alleviating some of the suffering now imposed on our prisoners, their families
and their friends.
So, despite the treaty's shortcomings and its inability to deal with
all of the abuses of human and legal rights in Mexico, I urge this committee to move swiftly and positively. As one mother of an American
prisoner in Mexico described the treaty, "It's like table scraps. But
when you're very hungry, even those scraps are very welcome."
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Rep. Stark). See
also id. at 48. Professor Wechsler added:
[W]e. . . have to live in the world and the world is an international
community, and therefore accommodations must be made. They must
be made in terms of the spirit, the purpose, and the history, and the
assumptions of the framers [of the Constitution] as they were given to
us and as our statesmen and courts have dealt with them for over 200
years.
Id. at 131. See also House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 179; 123 CONG. REC.
S12,551 (daily ed. July 21, 1977) ("I intend to vote for this treaty out of humane
considerations") (remarks of Sen. Tower); 123 CONG. REC. HI 1,459, HI 1,461 (daily
ed. Oct. 25, 1977):
I feel that since this treaty is so unique, and since we have no precedents
to fall back upon, that we will be doing a great moral injustice to our
fellow Americans imprisoned in Mexico if we let speculative legal arguments block this treaty. [We should] let a judicial rather than a legislative or executive setting provide the forum for the resolution of such
fine constitutional disputes.
(remarks of Rep. Brown); note 274 infra.
272. See, e.g., Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 3, at 2, 81, 128; Senate
Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 2, 25. In fact, the United States has recently
concluded a bilateral prisoner exchange treaty with Bolivia, Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, reprinted in TREATY WITH
BOLIVIA ON THE PENAL SENTENCES, S. EXEC. Doc. G., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),

utilizing the same legislation as that employed for the Treaty with Mexico. See id. at
vi (Letter of Submittal from Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State). Although the waiver
of collateral attack provision of the Treaty with Bolivia is of slightly different wording
than article VI of the Treaty with Mexico, its import and effect are identical. See
Treaty with Bolivia, art. VII: "The Transferring State shall retain exclusive jurisdiction regarding the sentences imposed and any procedures that provide for revision,
modification, or cancellation of the sentences pronounced by its courts. The Receiving State, upon being informed of any decision in this regard, will put such measures
into effect." See also note 47 supra. One source reports that "some seventy-five
other countries might eventually be persuaded to give up their 1,600 imprisoned U.S.
nationals." HARPER'S, Nov. 1977, at 26, col. 3. Moreover, the United Nations has
begun a study of the possibility of a multilateral agreement. See Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 3, at 2.
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273 There is no doubt
fits for American citizens confined abroad.
274
that the negotiators of the Treaty considered the trade-offs and
concluded with what they thought was the best acceptable resolution. 27" Thus, as we anticipate possible judicial review of the
that in
Treaty and legislation, 276 we are constrained to be mindful
278
27 7
ones.
simple
are
decisions
all
not
law, as in life,

I am one of the fortunate few to have returned home to a country
where human rights and due process of law are more than just words.
The hundreds of suffering Americans still imprisoned in Mexican jails,
living under the worst conditions imaginable, are desperately in need of
the spark of hope that only their Government can provide-the knowledge that their country still cares.
Senate Judiciary Hearings,supra note 3, at 291 (statement of Robert Miller, former
prisoner).
274. "[The Treaty poses] an extraordinarily difficult and unprecedented choice; a
choice between vindicating, under quite insistent circumstances, some of the most
cherished values of our society or, denying those values, in order that the government
may meet a no less [insistent] demand for the alleviation of human suffering." Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 3, at 103 (statement of Alan C. Swan). See
also id. at 131, 171; notes 37, 271 supra.
275. See notes 102, 172, 271 supra.
276. See notes 213, 242 supra. Apart from the major issues addressed in this Article, the Treaty and legislation also have potential problems in other areas, such as
equal protection, see, e.g., House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at 117-20, 217, 22122, 227; notes 13, 168 supra,and cruel and unusual punishment, see, e.g., id. at 241-43,
262. See also note 162 supra. In addition, very substantial concern existed in Congress regarding pre-trial detainees, who were not covered by the Treaty. See, e.g.,
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 2, at 184; Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 3, at 17, 129; Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 3, at 129, 174-75 (Bassiouni suggesting that entire trial be held in United States), 176 ("They do not have
any idea whether or not they are going to get to trial and whether anybody even
knows they are there or whether or not they have been forgotten") (remarks of Sen.
Biden), 291, 325-26. On the Treaty's potential constitutional problems generally, see
id. at 217-52. Of course, the fundamental problems go beyond the American Constitution. Such problems include improper consular services, see, e.g., Senate Foreign
RelationsHearings,supra note 3, at 222-23; House JudiciaryHearings,supra note 2, at
153-57, 170-73, 184-85, inadequate process at Mexican trials, see, e.g., SenateJudiciary
Hearings,supra note 3, at 126, 258-59, 304, and, perhaps at the root of all other
problems, the economic troubles of Mexico, see, e.g., id. at 257-58, 325; notes 2, 225
supra, and. the resultant drug traffic. See, e.g., TIME, Letter to the Editor, Jan. 9,
1978, at 4, col. 3: "The 'school's out' exuberance generated by the photographs and
text in regard to the release/exchange of the Americans from Mexican prisons...
hides the fact that many of these individuals were trafficking drugs. Their activities
could thus result in degradation of human life far beyond anything they experienced."
277. "[Llaw isn't something that exists as a closed system within itself, but draws
its juices from life." F. Frankfurter, in H. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 168 (1960). "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience."
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
278. "The law is not a series of calculating machines where definitions and answers come tumbling out when the right levers are pushed," Douglas, The Dissent. A
Safeguard of Democracy, 32 AM. JUD. Soc. 104, 105 (1948), "ifor the law... is full
of perplexities," Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 371 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring), and "as the usages of society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various
situations of mankind." Barwell v. Brooks, [1784] 3 Doug. 371, 373, 99 Eng. Rep.
702, 703 (1784) (opinion of Lord Mansfield). See also notes 102, 172 supra.
273.

